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THE NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL 
FRAMEWORK, CHAPTER 11 
INVESTMENT PROVISIONS, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
FRANCISCO S. NOGALES' 
Hurt not the earth, neither the sea, nor the trees. 
- Revelation 7:3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the period since 1989, international markets have become more 
integrated than ever before, and economic prospects of individual 
countries have become - more than ever before - bound up in the fate of 
the world economy.' Globalization should have a positive effect on the 
global and national economies according to the theory of comparative 
advantage, where each country produces and exports only those products 
that it can most efficiently produce compared to other nations. 
Consequently, efficient production should result in better use of national 
and world resources, ultimately leading to improved economies, lower 
prices for consumers, and overall benefits for the world in general. The 
* I would like to thank three Golden Gate University School of Law professors for assisting 
with this paper: Professor Helen Hartnell for helping me define the scope of the paper; Professor 
Paul KibeI for providing me with important and timely information that was utilized extensively in 
the paper; and most of all, Professor Armin Rosencranz for enlightening me, guiding me, and 
motivating me to reach this very important personal goal - to have this paper published. Lastly, I 
would like to thank the entire GGU International Legal Studies department for the opportunities that 
they provided me and the lifelong lessons that they taught me while completing the LL.M. program 
and writing this paper. For these I will be forever grateful. 
I. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Globalization and International 
Competitiveness; Some Broad Lessons of the Past Decade, in GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
2000, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (Harvard University 2000). 
97 
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positive results of globalization in recent years tend to validate this 
theory.2 
. The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was established 
in this evolving era of global trading and developing regional trade 
unions, and was ratified by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to 
form the world's largest free trade market.3 But more importantly, 
NAFT A was historically significant because it provided: 
1. protections to its investors, 
2. extensive intellectual property provisions, and 
3. a model for integrating an economically developing country -
Mexico - with two of the most developed economies in the world 
- the United States and Canada.' 
While Mexico, the United States and Canada long ago realized the 
importance of developing a strong regional trade association, a review of 
NAFT A since its inception has shown that this agreement has extended 
beyond the boundaries of economics, and could have an increasing 
influence on the lives of Mexicans, Canadians, and Americans alike, 
partially due to the treaty's impact on the environment. These 
environmental problems can be traced back to two parts of the NAFTA 
treaty: the NAFTA Environmental Framework,s and NAFTA Chapter 11 
Investment Provisions.6 In particular, the effectiveness of the NAFTA 
2. NAFf A trade has also been shown to reinforce already-existing patterns of comparative 
advantage and specialization. (See Part I - Final Analytic Framework for Assessing the 
Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, at 2, Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, 1999.) Interestingly enough, according to the Harvard study mentioned 
in footnote I, the growth of particular national economies during the last ten years of globalization 
has been variable, based on critical factors such as a country's ability to implement new 
technologies. However, an analysis of how, why, and to what eJ(tent individual nations have 
benefited from globalization is outside the scope of this paper. 
3. BAKER & MCKENZIE, NAFfA HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR DOING BUSINESS 
UNDER.NAFfA IO (CCH Incorporated, 1994). Prior to NAFfA, the economies of the U.S., 
MeJ'ico, and Canada represented the largest integrated market in the world - approJ'imately 370 
million consumers. 
4. Id. at 26. 
5. The NAFfA Environmental Framework mentioned here refers to the environmental 
provisions established by the NAFfA 'Environmental Side Agreement (i.e., the North American 
Agreement for Environmental Cooperation or the NAAEC). 
6. At least one critic has claimed that NAFf A harmonization of standards and regulations in 
areas such as endangered species, pesticides, and hazardous waste transportation has been another 
source of environmental degradation caused by NAFfA. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch -
Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA, and International 
Harmonization - at I, http://www.citizen.org/pctradelharmonizationalertlHarmBackgrounder.htm. 
However, this topic is also outside the scope of this paper. 
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environmental side agreement has been questioned by many critics,7 and 
the ability of foreign corporations to use Chapter II's provisions in ways 
that can restrict or even negate governments' ability to protect human 
welfare and the environment has been the cause for much concern.8 
In this paper, the author will discuss some of the environmental issues 
surrounding these two parts of the NAFfA machinery based on recent 
developments.9 Written in seven parts, Part II provides the NAFT A 
historical background. Part III discusses the NAFf A Environmental 
Framework, and Part IV discusses the NAFf A Chapter 11 Investment 
Provisions. Part V reviews the Submissions of Environmental 
Enforcement Matters and provides recent academic criticisms of the 
CEC Process and NAFf A Chapter 11 based on NAFf A environmental 
studies. Part VI reviews critical Chapter 11 cases. Part Vll provides 
critique and recommendations on how improvements might be made, and 
Part VIII concludes the paper. 
ll. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAFT A 
Trade between Mexico and the United States has always been 
substantial. In the final year prior to NAFTA, U.S. trade with Mexico 
was US$81 billion, with Mexico being one of the few countries with 
which the United States has enjoyed a trade surplus. 1O In fact, Mexico 
ranked second as a United States trading partner in 2000, accounting for 
7. Public comments solicited by the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), which is part 
of the NAFfA environmental framework to be discussed later, generally referred to transparency, 
timeliness, and effectiveness as the main concerns surrounding NAFfA's overall environmental 
submission process. 
8. See Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Problems, A Guide to NAFrA's Controversial 
Chapter On Investor Rights, International Institute For Sustainable Development, 2001, at I. Also 
according to Dr. Mann, in spite of enormous concern among many critics, NAFfA's investment 
rules continue to provide the working model for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, and 
for other international agreements. See Howard Mann, supra, at viii. The view by many critics is 
that the use of NAFf A Chapter 11 as a model for other investment agreements is at this point 
premature for reasons that are discussed later. 
9. Professor Paul KibeI suggests that prior to the current regime of North American 
environmental law, the pre-1993 period was limited to national issues that were physically 
transnational and did not deal with environmental and natural issues that were economically or 
politically transnational, areas which are now at the center of the current trade-environment debate. 
See CEC: JPAC: Comments on the JPAC Public Review of Issues Concerning the Implementation 
and Further Elaboration of Articles 14 and 15; Paul Stanton KibeI, The Paper Tiger Awakens: 
North American Environmental Law After The Cozumel Reef Case, March, 2000, at 7; 
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/comments/Kibel.pdf. 
10. See BAKER & McKENZIE, supra note 3 at 10. 
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10% of U.S. trade. 1I Furthermore, in 2000, $123.2 billion in merchandise 
exports to Mexico dramatically surpassed U.S. exports to Japan, even 
though the Mexican economy is just one-tenth the size of Japan's.12 That 
year, the United States was Mexico's predominant trading partner, 
accounting for 82% of Mexican exports and 70% of Mexican imports. 13 
The idea of establishing a free trade arena was first introduced by then 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas in early 1990.14 Salinas saw NAFfA 
as a way of facilitating Mexico's socioeconomic development. ls This 
view was supported by the evolving investment liberalization rules that 
emerged during the 1980's, which would be incorporated into NAFTA-
that an investment agreement would be a positive element in attracting 
foreign investors, and that investment liberalization would lead to a 
higher level of economic efficiency for the host countries and businesses 
alike. 16 Mexican officials also believed that Mexico's future would be 
enhanced by closer cooperation and integration with its northern 
neighbor. 11 Additionally Mexico wanted to guard against resurgent U.S. 
protectionism by first securing market access, and then profiting from 
preferential access to the U.S. market, which would likely bring greater 
quality, innovation, and efficiencies that come with free market 
competition. IS 
United States officials recognized the economic value of the developing 
Mexican market, where U.S. exports had nearly doubled during the prior 
five years. 19 The U.S. also realized the need to develop regional 
competitiveness in light of other regional trade agreements that were 
being forged around the world.20 Furthermore, the U.S. foresaw the value 
of having a stable and increasingly prosperous democratic southern 
neighbor, leading to greater political and economic stability, reduced 
11. See U.S. Department Of State: Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Mfairs, Background Note: 
Mexico, Profile, Apri12001, at 5, http://www.state.gov/r/palbgnJindex.cfm?docid=1838. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 9. 
15. According to Dr. Mann, Mexico also embraced the goal of attracting new foreign 
investment, and saw NAFfA's Chapter 11 investment provisions as a way of advertising that 
Mexico was a new and safe place to do business. Five and six years later, Mexico became the most 
steadfast supporter of the NAFf A investment regime, having seen an exponential increase in 
investments from its NAFfA partners. See Mann, supra note 8, at 7. 
16. [d. at 6. 
17. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 10. 
18. [d. at 11. 
19. [d. at 10. 
20. [d. at 11. 
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friction, and fewer problems.21 This situation was also fueled by the fact 
that trading prior to NAFf A had resulted in an average 10 percent 
Mexican tariff being applied to U.S. exports, while the average U.S. 
tariff was only 2.07 percenU2 
Summarizing the historical ties between Mexico and the U.S. that have 
had so much to do with the establishment of NAFf A, U.S. relations with 
Mexico are as important and complex as with any country in the world.23 
U.S. relations with Mexico have a direct impact on the lives and 
livelihoods of millions of Americans - whether the issue is trade and 
economic reform, drug control, migration, or the promotion of 
democracy.24 As recognized by many, the time was ripe to abandon the 
various levels of trade protectionism that each country had previously 
utilized, and NAFf A was signed, ratified, and became effective on 
January 1, 1994. 
Since implementation, the economic effects of NAFf A reported by both 
government and outside studies have been consistent. However, 
isolating these effects has been particularly difficult because of three 
significant events: 1) the strong performance of the U.S. economy, 2) 
Mexico's balance-of-payment crisis and recession of 1995, and 3) U.S. 
implementation of most favored nation ("MFN") tariff cuts mandated by 
the Uruguay Round agreements.25 Several important economic effects of 
NAFf A reported by the United States Trade Representative are 
mentioned below. 
- Since NAFfA's passage in 1993, American's economy has 
boomed. As of this writing, we had created the longest 
peacetime expansion in American history. We had reduced 
unemployment from 7.4 percent to 4.3 percent - the lowest level 
in twenty-eight years, with eighteen million more Americans on 
the job today than at the beginning of 1993.26 
21. [d. 
22. According to the General Secretariat, Organization of American States. NAFfA has 
reduced Mexico's average tariff to 2.9 percent (a 7.1 percent drop) and the U.S. average tariff to .65 
percent (a 1.4 percent drop); see Study On The Operation and Effect Of The North American Free 
Trade Agreement. General Secretariat. Organization of American States. (1996-2000) at Chapter I. 
Part I. 1. 
23. See U.S. Department Of State. supra note II. at 7. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 9. 
26. See USTR - "NAFfA Works For America" NAFfA 5-Year Report Card. July 1999. at 1. 
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- During NAFfA's first five years, U.S. merchandise exports 
to Mexico increased 90 percent. U.S. merchandise exports to 
Canada, our largest trading partner, increased 55 percent. 
Together, this meant $93 billion in export growth from 1993 to 
1998 - two fifths of the growth in U.S. exports to the world.27 
- Jobs supported by U.S. goods exports to our NAFfA partners 
were estimated to total 2.6 million in 1998, an increase of 31 
percent (over 600,000 new jobs) from 1993, prior to NAFfA.28 
Goods export-related jobs pay an average of 16% more than non-
export relatedjobs.29 
- The vast bulk - over 85 percent - of our NAFfA trade is in 
manufactured goods. Trade in this sector grew by over 66 
percent between 1993 and 1998.30 
- U.S. agricultural exports to NAFfA partners totaled $13.2 
billion in 1998, or a fourth of all U.S. agricultural exports to the 
world.3l 
- U.S. merchandise exports to Canada climbed nearly 66 
percent since NAFfA entered into force.32 
- U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico have more than doubled 
from pre-NAFfA levels (growing from $41.6 billion in 1993 to 
$87 billion in 1999.33 
In contrast, in its own study, Public Citizen reported substantially 
different results at the NAFfA five-year mark. For example, the group 
claimed the loss of higher paying U.S. manufacturing jobs replaced by 
lower wage service jobs.34 Public Citizen also reported a widespread job 
loss of over 200,000 U.S. workers certified as NAFTA casualties under 
just one narrow government program.35 Other Public Citizen findings 
include: 
27. [d. 
28. /d. 
29. See USTR - World Regions - Western Hemisphere, NAFTA Ove11liew, June 2001, at I, 
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/overview.shtml. 
30. See USTR, supra note 26, at 1. 
31. /d. 
32. See The President's 1999 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program and 2000 
Trade Policy Agenda, at 173. 
33. [d., 
34. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - School of Real-Life Results - Report Card -
NAFTA January 1, 1994 to January 1, 1999 (December 1998), at 4. 
35. [d. at 3. 
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- The replacement of high-paying manufacturing jobs with 
lower paying employment such as cashiers, waitresses, janitors 
and retail clerks,36 
- The development of "negative bargaining power" for many 
American workers whose jobs have not been relocated by 
putting them in direct competition with skilled, educated 
Mexican workers who work for a dollar or two an hour - or 
less,37 
- NAFfA's failure to reverse the trend of so-called U.S. 
"exports," where U.S. goods are shipped to Mexican 
maquiladora plants, and then re-imported back to the U.S. as 
finished products,38 
- The development of a $8.9 billion manufacturing sector trade 
deficit with Mexico, from a pre-NAFf A $4.6 billion trade 
surplus,39 and 
- The failure of 60 of 67 companies to fulfill their promise to 
create new jobs after NAFfA, when they had made that promise 
during a February 1997 Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch 
investigation.40 
103 
In the author's view, reconciling these two contradictory posltlOns 
requires the consideration of the one overriding and generally accepted 
economic phenomenon already mentioned - that since NAFfA's 
passage, America has experienced the longest peacetime expansion in 
American history.41 It is clear that NAFfA has at least not derailed this 
economic expansion. 
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK OF NAFfA 
Much of the opposition to NAFf A was based on fear that environmental 
standards would become so relaxed that companies would elect to 
36. [d. at4. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. According to the Public Citizen report, in 1990,34.7 % of U.S. exports to Mexico were 
re-shipped to the U.S. as finished goods. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. 
41. See US1R, supra note 26, at 1. 
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relocate to Mexico.42 Concerns were also raised that additional industrial 
activity generated by NAFf A would exacerbate pre-existing 
environmental and public health problems caused by a high 
concentration of export manufacturing plants in the free trade zone along 
the U.S.-Mexico border.43 Environmental groups were split over 
NAFTA, with the Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, 
the World Wildlife Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
supporting the agreement, and Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the 
Sierra Club opposing it.44 
The United States sought strong provisions and enforcement structures to 
protect the environment/5 so a "parallel track" environmental agenda was 
initiated independent of the NAFTA negotiations, and on August 12, 
1993, Canada, the U.S., and Mexico signed the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC").46 
However, within NAFTA itself, Article 104: Relation to Environmental 
and Conservation Agreements sets out to reiterate the prevailing 
obligations of three prior treaties: the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (done on March 3, 
1973), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
Ozone Layer (done on September 16, 1987), and the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (done on March 22, 1989). Furthermore, Annex 104.1; 
Bilateral and Other Environmental and Conservation Agreements also 
bound the parties to two other conservation agreements: The Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste 
(1986), and the Agreement Between the U.S. and Mexico on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in 
the Border Area (1983). 
42. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245. Furthennore, NAFfA Chapter II Article 
1114 was included in NAFf A to minimize the relaxation of environmental standards for the purpose 
of attracting foreign investment. See discussion in Part ill, infra. 
43. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at 6. 
44. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245. 
45. Professor Paul KibeI suggests that the mere initiation of environmental negotiations at this 
time indicates that between 1990 and 1992, the public increasingly came to view trade integration 
and environmental protection as interrelated, rather than as independent policy issues. (See KibeI, 
supra note 9, at 9.) 
46. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245. 
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The NAAEC establishes the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
("CEC") to address regional environmental concerns, help prevent 
potential trade and environmental conflicts, and promote the enforcement 
of environmental law.47 The Council is also responsible for further 
consultation and cooperation among the parties to avoid environment-
related trade disputes.48 The NAAEC also provides that any non-
governmental organization, and any person, may make submissions to 
the CEC Secretariat asserting that one of the parties is failing to 
effectively enforce its environmentallaws.49 
Upon submission of an Article 14 petition, the Secretariat must then 
determine whether the submission merits a response from the alleged 
violating party under Article 14(2).50 The Secretariat must consider 
whether (a) the submission alleges harm to the submitter, (b) the 
submission would advance the goals of the NAAEC, (c) private remedies 
have been pursued, and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from 
mass media reports.51 There is no time limit for the Secretariat to make 
this determination. 52 
If the Secretariat determines that no response is necessary and that the 
submission need not be considered, it must set forth its position in a 
"determination."53 If the Secretariat determines that a response is 
merited, the alleged violating party has 60 days to prepare a response as 
to whether judicial proceedings are pending, and whether private 
remedies are available. If the Secretariat, after review of the response, 
determines that additional investigation is warranted, Article 15 provides 
that the Secretariat can request that the Council approve, by a two-thirds 
vote, the preparation of a "factual record" of the dispute.54 Again, there is 
47. Id. at 251. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 252. However, under Article 14(1), the submitter must be a person or organization 
residing in or established in the territory of a party; and under Article 14(2), the Secretariat must 
consider whether the submission alleges harm to the submitter prior to determining whether a 
response is warranted. So given the effect of Article 14(1) and 14(2), the idea that any person or 
non-governmental organization can make a submission is somewhat misleading, since these 
"standing" requirements can render the submission invalid. 
50. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 17. Prior to determining whether a response is merited, the 
submission must meet other formal standards set forth in Article 14(1) such as clear identification of 
the submitting party, and the provision of enough information to determine whether a response is 
warranted. (See CEC - Lessons Learned - Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15 of the 
NAAEC, Submitted by the JPAC, April 2001, at 3.) 
51. See CEC, supra note 50, at 4. 
52. Id. 
53. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 17. 
54. Id. Critics have also commented that there are no established standards for determining 
whether an investigation is warranted. 
9
Nogales: NAFTA Environmental Framework
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
106 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTL & COMPo LAW [Vol. 8:1 
no deadline for this decision.55 This request to the Council is set forth in 
a "deterrnination."56 If authorized by the Council, this factual record will 
evaluate the factual and legal basis for the Article 14 petition.57 The final 
version of the Secretariat's factual record m.ust be approved by a two-
thirds vote of the CEC's Council. 58 
Beyond publication of the factual record by the CEC, there are no other 
penalties or sanctions available to private parties for enforcing the 
NAAEC's provision, nor are there procedures to ensure actual 
implementation of any recommendations that may be set forth in the 
factual record.59 Some criticism of NAFT A has been based on this 
apparent lack of CEC enforcement power.60 However, supporters 
emphasize that as sovereign nations, each NAFT A party has a sovereign 
right to control the activities within its own borders, and that this right 
must act as a limitation to the treaty's grant of environmental oversight 
authority.61 Officials from the CEC have also pointed out that the CEC is 
not an enforcement agency, and that in fact, no international 
environmental organization has enforcement power.62 
55. See CEC, supra note 50, at 4. 
56. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 17. 
57. Id. at 18. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at 18. 
61. The principle of national sovereignty is emphasized many times in the. NAFfA 
instrumentation. To illustrate three examples, the NAFT A Preamble itself states that the NAFf A 
parties are "RESOLVED TO . .. PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare .... " 
Furthermore, the NAAEC Preamble states that the NAFTA parties have agreed to the NAAEC, 
while "REAFFIRMING the SOVEREIGN RIGHT of States to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental and development policies and their responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction .... " Finally, in Council Resolution 00-09 which is 
discussed later, the CEC states that it 'FURTHER [Recognizes] that countries that are parties to 
international agreements are SOLELY COMPETENT to interpret such instruments ... .' However, 
the principle of national sovereignty has become a double-edged sword that is also at the center of 
this debate. For example, the right of a sovereign nation to govern over its own land and protect its 
own people also extends to abusing its own citizens and destroying its own environment. AIl three 
NAFf A parties have expressed concern over this national sovereignty-environmental protection 
balancing problem, particularly as it relates to "the other" NAFfA parties. [emphasis added] 
62. Scott Vaughan, the Head of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program for the CEC, 
responded with this footnoted answer to the request to please comment on the enforcement power of 
the CEC on June 12, 2001, in a questionnaire sent to him specifically for this paper. Other 
commentators have also responded along similar lines. For example, see CEC: JPAC, Public 
Consultation on the Draft JPAC Public Review of Issues Concerning the Implementation and 
Further Elaboration of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC, Executive Summary of Public Comments 
Received, October 2000, at 15, where the Canadian Council for International Business (CCrn) stated 
that 'The function of the [CEq is to promote the effective enforcement of environmentallaw ... it is 
not the CEC's role to set policies or mandate environmental practices - this is the proper domain of 
the NAFf A governments.' 
10
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 8 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol8/iss1/6
2002] NAFI' A ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK 107 
Because individual parties have raised other issues about the 
interpretation and application of Articles 14 and 15 under the NAAEC/3 
on June 12,2000, the CEC established a public review process for issues 
concerning the "implement{ltion and further elaboration" of those articles 
under Council Resolution 00-09.64 This resolution also established the 
Joint Public Advisory Committee ("JPAC") to conduct the public review 
process, and to advise the Council on how these issues might be 
resolved.6s However, the Council stated that the premier purpose of 
Council Resolution 00-09 was to ensure that any discussions concerning 
the implementation of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC included a 
process for public involvement~66 The Council further reiterated that this 
review process " ... does not mean amendment of the NAAEC."67 
In essence, the review process dictates that it is. the responsibility of the 
JPAC to receive issues from the public,68 transmit them to the Council, 
and provide advice to the Council on all issues referred to it by the 
Council no matter what the source (party, Secretariat, public or JPAC 
itself).69 Any member of the public wishing to raise an issue may provide 
a written statement to the JPAC, but the statement may not exceed three 
pages.70 If the JPAC determines that the written statement does not raise 
a relevant issue, the JPAC will forward the statement to the Council 
accompanied by a written explanation of why it considers that the issue 
63. See CEC: JPAC - Who We Are - Council - COUNCIL RESOLUTION 00·09, June 13, 
2000, at I, http://www.cec.orglwho_we_arelcouncillresolution. 
64. "Implementation and further elaboration" according to the Council means "carry into 
effect, as determined through a review of the policies and practices of the Council, Secretariat, and 
JPAC." (See CEC supra note 9, at 1.) 
65. Id. 
66. Id. In the Resolution's Preamble, the CEC further recognized "the need for transparency 
and public participation before decisions are made concerning implementation of the public 
submission process under Articles [14 and 15]." The JPAC released calls for comments on this 
review process on July 31, 2000, to 5,800 persons from various sectors including NGO's, 
government bodies, acadernic institutions, etc., and the general comments received stated that this 
new review process has "the potential to bring much needed transparency." Other notable 
comments received from the public overwhelmingly relate to the timeliness and effectiveness of the 
Article 14 and 15 submission process. The other purpose of the JPAC stated in this document is to 
"[review] the public history of submissions made under Articles 14 and 15, including all actions 
taken to implement those articles, and [to compile] a report identifying lessons learned." (See CEC, 
supra note 63, at 1.) 
67. Id. 
68. According to the JPAC Public Consultation Guidelines, the purpose of a public issue may 
be to "Establish a policy or directive; assist in the preparation of the program of the CEC; obtain 
views in the context of a specific project; and address a specific issue or set of issues." (See CEC 
supra note 63, at 1.) 
69. See CEC: JPAC, supra note 62, at 8. 
70. [d. 
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is not within the scope of Resolution 00-09.71 The written explanation 
will also be sent to the person (or organization) who raised the issue, and 
the explanation will be posted on the CEC website within seven working 
days.72 
When the JPAC determines that the issue raised by the public is relevant, 
it will transmit the issue - in writing - to the Council, and this 
determination will also be sent to the person who raised the issue.?3 The 
issue will also be posted on the CEC website within seven working 
days.?4 When the JPAC receives the Council's decision to address or not 
• address the issue, this decision will be sent to the person who raised the 
issue, and the decision will be posted on the CEC website within seven 
working days.?5 
Upon receipt of an issue from the Council, the JPAC will hold a public 
review process in the format that it determines is necessary to provide 
advice to the CounciU6 This format will be posted on the CEC website.77 
Following its review, the JPAC will provide written advice, including 
reasoned argumentation to the Council.78 The written advice will also be 
sent to the person who raised the issue, and the advice will be posted on 
the CEC website within seven working days.?9 
IV. NAFf A INVESTMENT PROVISIONS 
NAFfA's investment provisions are covered in Chapter 11, and apply to 
investments by an investor of one party in the territory of another party 
and with the resolution of a dispute between a party and an investor of 
71. [d. The author believes that there also need to be published standards for the JPAC's 
determination of a "relevant issue" in this context. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. As with the JPAC determination of "relevant issue," the author believes the factors 
considered, and the process followed by the CEC to make a decision on whether to address or not 
address an issue, need to be defined and made public. 
76. [d. at 9. It seems reasonable to assume that the public review format selected by the JPAC 
would also be "transparent." However, no documentation has been found to suggest that 
transparency will be a requirement of the public review format selected by the JPAC. Standards in 
this area would also be helpful, specifying the process the JP AC will follow in determining the 
review format, and the factors it will consider in making that determination. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. 
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another party.so Under these provisions, investments and investors are 
protected from certain types of "measures" taken by governments.81 The 
definition of "measures" is broad - it includes all laws adopted by 
national, state or provincial legislatures; regulations that implement these 
laws; local or municipal laws and bylaws; and policies that affect 
government interaction with businesses82 - which means that investors 
are protected from nearly all forms of government action.83 Chapter 11 
also applies to all "measures," including those that were adopted prior to 
NAFf A unless they were specifically excluded by being listed in an 
Annex to NAFf A. 84 However, this retroactivity does not apply to local, 
state, and provincial measures adopted before January 1, 1994.85 
The foundation of NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Provisions lies in 
five binding principles, which have been the subject of considerable 
dispute since NAFTA's inception. These binding principles include:1I6 
- National treatment (Article 1102); 
- Most-favoured nation treatment (Article 1103); 
- Minimum international standard of treatment (Article 1104); 
- Prohibitions against certain performance requirements on 
investors (Article 1106); and 
- Provisions governing expropriation (Article 1110). 
The NAFf A parties are susceptible to attack for violation of any of these 
principles under the authority vested in Chapter 11, Section B of the 
NAFf A Agreement. Unprecedented in international law, Section B 
outlines provisions governing the "Settlement of Disputes between a 
Party and an Investor of Another Party." These provisions establish the 
80. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 123. Also see Chapter II Article 1101: Scope 
and Coverage. 
8!. See Mann, supra note 8, at 9. 
82. Id. 
83. The term "measures" is not the only word that has been interpreted broadly within the 
Chapter II context. For example in the S.D. Meyers v. Canada case (Notice of Arbitration: July 22, 
1998), "investment" was interpreted to mean assets such as market share in a sector, and access to 
markets in the host state, whether or not the investor even owns a physical plant or retail store in that 
country. That is, almost any kind of business activity can constitute an "investment" that is subject 
to protection. (See Mann, supra note 8, at 23.) 
84. Id. at 24. 
85. Id. 
86. See NAFTA 's Chapter II And The Environment: Addressing The Impacts Of The Investor-
State Process On The Environment; International Institute For Sustainable Development (IISD), at 3, 
httpllwww.iisd.ca. 
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most extensive set of rights and remedies ever provided to foreign 
investors in an international agreement.8? 
Originally included in NAFTA to protect U.S. and Canadian investors in 
what was considered a suspect Mexican system, the dispute settlement 
mechanism (via Article 1116) gives an individual investor the right to 
challenge host governments on their compliance with the agreement.88 
This right, in turn, has brought two central issues to the forefront. First, 
the process allows foreign investors· to sidestep procedural or public 
interest safeguards in favor of a non-transparent, secretive system of 
arbitration with no right to appea1.89 Secondly, given the ease of 
initiating these disputes (i.e., costs and preparation are minimal, and 
party consent is not required), the use of traditional defensive investor 
provisions has shifted to an offensive strategic tool.90 (See Ethyl Corp. 
case discussed in Part VI, infra.) 
Articles 1102 and 1103 provide for national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment of NAFT A investors. Both of these articles require that 
"Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances ... " "to its own 
investors" (Article 1102) and "to investors of any other Party ... " (Article 
1103). The conflict in these particular provisions has arisen from the 
expansive interpretation of "no less favorable" and "in like 
circumstances" in the cases already on record.91 (See Ethyl Corp. case 
discussed in Part VI, infra.) 
Article 1105 sets a minimum standard of treatment of investors "in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security." The cases on record attacking the 
parties for violation of this Article revolve around due process violations 
and the denial of justice.92 (See the Loewen case discussed in Part VI, 
infra.) 
Article 1106 establishes performance requirements for the NAFTA 
parties, and states that "No Party may impose or enforce any of the 
87. [d. Also of interest is that NAFfA investors may choose either the NAFfA or WTO 
dispute settlement procedures to resolve an issue. 
88. [d. This mechanism has been referred to as the investor-state dispute settlement process. 
89. [d. The dispute settlement process also gives rise to several potential constitutional 
problems that are discussed later in this paper. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 4. 
92. ld. 
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following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in 
connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a 
non-Party in its territory; [to export a given level. .. of goods, to achieve 
given level ... of domestic content] ... etc." 
Subsection 6 of Article 1106 outlines exceptions "necessary to protect 
human, animal, and plant life," and "the conservation of living and 
exhaustible natural resources." Conflicts have arisen when the NAFf A 
parties have attempted to utilize Article 1106 (6) exceptions given the 
narrowly interpreted meaning of "necessary" in the environmental and 
international law sense.93 Investors have also used Article 1106 to 
challenge bans on toxic substances, claiming that such bans essentially 
act as performance requirements by establishing domestic content 
requirements.94 (See the Ethyl Corp. case discussed in Part VI, infra.) 
Article 1106 is supplemented by the environmental language in Article 
1114, which contains an unprecedented international commitment to 
avoid relaxing environmental laws as a means of competing for foreign 
investmenU5 While the language of the core commitment in this article 
contains the term "should" instead of "shall," any party who believes that 
the spirit of the commitment is being violated can require other parties to 
enter into consultations.% But perhaps the most puzzling issue 
surrounding the environmental language in Articles 1106 and 1114 is 
that the relationship between a party's right under Article 1114 to 
challenge another party's alleged relaxation of environmental laws and 
the submission process for "environmental enforcement" matters under 
the NAAEC has never been established.91 Furthermore, the NAFrA 
governments have thus far been reluctant to allow the CEC to even 
explore this potential connection.98 
Article 1110 of the NAFfA Chapter 11 investment provisions outlines 
expropriation and compensation protections, and has probably attracted 
the most public attention because of the provision's impact on 
environmental regulations.99 Article 1110 states that "No Party may 
directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Mann, supra note 8, at 12. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 13. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 12. 
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investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment except: [(a) for a 
public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) on payment of 
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 6]." 
The major issues that have arisen under Article 1110 involve indirect 
nationalization, which has been argued in some cases to be tantamount to 
expropriation. 1oo Under the evolving "case law," a new legal-political 
concept of regulatory expropriation appears to be emerging. That is: 
Any national or sub-national government regulations (laws, 
treaties, administrative measures, policies), which reduce or limit 
the value of the private commercial property can be considered a 
form of regulatory expropriation. 101 
In light of these cases, the fear is that environmental and safety laws 
arising out of a NAFTA party's "police powers" will now be attacked as 
expropriation, which have typically not been appropriate substantive 
grounds under traditional international law.102 And given the expansive 
definition of the . term "measures" so far interpreted under these 
provisions, there is a real legal question as to whether these new investor 
rights conflict with U.S. constitutional rights granted to the U.S. 
government, which seems to allow for land regulation by state and local 
government under a less restrictive interpretation of "regulatory 
takings. "103 
As discussed in the Chapter 11 cases in Part VI, the full impact of the 
new investor rights granted under NAFT A Chapter 11 has yet to be 
determined, as seen by the lack of finality of many of the current 
disputes. However, the investor's strategic use of these provisions to 
claim expropriation because of health and environmental measures 
instituted by host governments could unfairly shift the cost of protecting 
health, safety, and the environment onto the shoulders of the taxpayer. 
As with the evaluation of any other investment, these costs should clearly 
be included in an investor's own risk assessment, and the responsibility 
for cleaning up any environmental damage should lie squarely with the 
polluter and not the public. Unfortunately, what has occurred so far as a 
100. [d. at 5. 
101. See WTO - The NAFTA Ruling On MetalClad I'S. Mexico, September 2000, at 4; 
http://www.wtoaction.org. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. Article 1110 now gives investors three ways to attack Party Article 1110 violations via 
expropriation, indirect expropriation, and measures tantamount to expropriation. 
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result of the NAFf A Chapter 11 investment provisions is the granting of 
special international law-based rights to foreign investors - and the 
means to enforce them - without the commensurate, counterbalancing 
obligations and responsibilities. l()4 
V. A REVIEW OF SUBMISSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT MATIERS AND RECENT ACADEMIC 
CRITICISM OF THE CEC SUBMISSION PROCESS BASED ON 
NAFf A ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 
Part of the purpose of the NAAEC is stated in the following quotation 
from Article 1 of the Agreement: 
Article 1: Objectives: 
The objectives of this Agreement are to: (a) foster the 
protection and improvement of the environment in the 
territories of the Parties for the well being of present 
and future generations .... 
Based on Article 1, objective (a), some obvious questions arise from the 
inclusion of a submission process designed to promote environmental 
enforcement. Primarily, how can challenging the lack of enforcement be 
a significant and effective way to protect and improve the environment 
for "present and future generations?"I05 If domestic environmental laws 
themselves are inadequate, how can environmental enforcement be 
challenged when there is no environmental law to enforce?l06 Or if the 
104. Mann, supra note 8, at 19. 
105. Professor Kibei suggests that environmental law under what he refers to as the 1993 North 
American Regime - which among other things includes the NAAEC, the CEC, and the JPAC, are not 
legal provisions or institutions, in that they do not set forth new, binding environmental standards for 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 14. He also brings up the 
question of whether the NAAEC framework is flexible enough to evolve politically, and whether 
environmentalists should try to limit the 1993 Regime as a model for international negotiations with 
other Central and South American nations. [d. at 47. 
106. To further illustrate this point, the JPAC has stated that "NGO's from the NAAEC 
countries have repeatedly turned to the Article 14 and 15 process when they believed that domestic 
environmental remedies were not adequate to address their complaint," and that the process of 
developing a factual record itself provides for opportunities and areas of compromise and settlement 
of environmental disputes [in the case of these potentially inadequate domestic environmental 
remedies]. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12. However in the author's opinion this analysis is 
incomplete. For example, if a domestic environmental law does not exist, or if a remedy is 
inadequate, domestic enforcement is not a problem. In this case, the CEC would not have 
jurisdiction over the environmental matter, no factual record would ever be created, and there would 
be no opportunity as described by the JPAC to address the inadequacies of the domestic 
environmental law - or its remedies. 
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judicial process itself is suspect, under what authority can unjust 
domestic judicial proceedings be challenged to enable the protection and 
improvement of the environment?107 And even more importantly, given 
that the NAAEC submission process does uncover a clear lack of 
environmental enforcement as it is designed to do, what guarantees are 
there that the abuse will be corrected, or that the process will produce 
any positive results whatsoever?108 Instead, why couldn't strong 
remedies,l09 provisions, or environmental standardsllo agreed upon by the 
NAFfA parties be used to hold NAFfA polluters accountable, since 
these polluters would have already voluntarily availed themselves of the 
benefits of NAFf A ?III And couldn't these violators themselves be 
subjected to NAFfA remedies without compromising a NAFfA party's 
sovereign right to self-govem?112 
These issues highlight some of the very problems inherent in trying to 
measure the effectiveness of the NAFf A environmental policy, since the 
NAAEC speaks of environmental protection but only provides for 
"foster[ing]" environmental enforcement. Stuck between the lines of this 
fuzzy NAFfA language,1\3 both the environmental submissions, and the 
reported environmental effects caused by NAFfA are discussed below. 
First, a short summary of all the submissions since 1995 is provided, 
107. It seems that this situation could still occur, notwithstanding the procedural guarantees 
enumerated in Article 7 of the NAAEC, which calls for "fair, open, and equitable ... [judicial 
proceedings] ... that comply with due process of law .... " 
108. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12. 
109. With regard to the inclusion of stronger remedies, some commentators have suggested that 
a more adequate remedy plan, including preventive and corrective programs, could be linked to the 
factual record via Article 13 (i.e., include these remedies in the factual report) without amending the 
NAAEC. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12. However, even if remedies were included in the factual 
record, in this case, the question would still remain as to how these recommended remedies would be 
enforced. 
110. On the issue of standards, the author is not professing that a complete set of environmental 
policies should have been included in NAFr A. The point is that perhaps some level of 
environmental regulation could have been agreed upon to help directly address environmental 
violations. 
111. Professor Kibei suggests that regardless of the apparent lack of enforceability, the 
components discussed here as the "NAFr A Environmental Provisions" are still useful in 
establishing soft norms and general principles that may help shape how Canada, Mexico, and the 
U.S. approach and resolve environmental issues within the context of the 1993 North American 
Regime. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 15. 
112. The author is re-emphasizing the point that NAFrA (via the NAAEC) should have been 
structured to minimize environmental harm rather than to maximize environmental enforcement, and 
that this could have been accomplished without jeopardizing a NAFr A party's national sovereignty. 
In fact, it has been reported that President Clinton himself announced in October 4, 1992 speech at 
North Carolina State University that the CEC "should have the power to provide remedies, including 
the power to impose penalties and assess monetary damages." See Kibei, supra note 9, at 9. 
113. In the author's view, the NAAEC Article I objective (a) amounts to little more than excess 
verbiage because even in the best light, the instrument does not provide adequate tools for 
accomplishing this goal. 
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followed by a more detailed discussion of the two submissions that 
resulted in the development of a factual record - Cozumel (submission 
ID SEM-96-001), and BC Hydro (submission ID SEM-97-001). 
Criticism of the CEC submission process based on a review of NAFf A 
environmental studies completes this section. 
According to the CEC Secretariat, as of this writing, thirty-one 
submissions have been received since 1995, of which ten involve 
Canada, thirteen Mexico, and eight the United States. 114 Nineteen files 
have been closed, and twelve submissions are under review. Of the 
closed files, seven have been dismissed under Article 14(1), three have 
been dismissed under Article 14(2), two submissions have been 
terminated under Article 14(3), three submissions have been terminated 
under Article 15(1), one submission has been terminated under Article 
15(2), one submission has been withdrawn, and two factual records have 
been prepared and made public. 
Of the twelve submissions currently under review, eight involve Mexico 
(SEM-00-OO6, SEM-OI-003, SEM-97-002, SEM-00-OO5, SEM-OI-OOl, 
SEM-00-005, SEM-OI-003, SEM-OI-00l), one involves the United 
States (SEM-98-003), and three involve Canada (SEM-97-006, SEM-98-
004, SEM-00-04). On May 16, 2000, the Council unanimously decided 
to instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record with respect to 
SEM-98-007, and the Secretariat informed the Council that the 
Secretariat considers that SEM-98-006 warrants developing a factual 
record, both of which involve Mexico. lls And on December 15,2000, the 
Secretariat informed the Council that the Secretariat considers that SEM-
00-002 warrants developing a factual record, which involves the U.S.116 
In trying to assess the significance of all these submissions in light of 
these impressive numbers,117 the author will reiterate some points that 
have already been discussed to some extent at the beginning of this 
section: 
How do we know that all environmental enforcement abuses have been 
reported? And what can be done to optimize the reporting of 
114. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters; Status, at I, httpllwww.cec.orglcitizenlstatus/index. 
liS. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. The author suggests that at first glance, the number of submissions received since 1995 
(thirty-one), and the percentage of closed files (about 61 %) both could be viewed as respectable 
statistics given the length of time that NAFf A has been in force. 
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enforcement abuses through NAAEC submissions? (See the summary of 
the Relocation of the Stonewashing Industry study in Part V where 
environmental abuses have not been reported.) 
How can we assess and reconcile the possibility that a NAFT A party's 
environmental laws are inadequate or even approach a minimum level of 
protection? And how can we strive to correct these judicial inadequacies 
without violating the sovereign rights of each NAFT A party? 
How can we encourage the NAFTA parties to take the necessary steps to 
remedy the environmental harm caused by NAFTA?"8 
A. THE CRUISE SHIP PIER PROJECT IN COZUMEL AND BC HYDRO 
The two current factual records may shed light on the existing process. 
The Cazumel case was the fIrst submission that resulted in the 
development of a factual record under the NAAEC guidelines. In 
Cazumel, the submitters, consisting of the Committee For The Protection 
Of Natural Resources A.C., the International Group Of One Hundred, 
A.c., an~ the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, A.c., alleged that 
the appropriate authorities failed to effectively enforce environmental 
laws which in their view called for the development of a comprehensive 
Environmental Impact Assessment ("BIA") for the entire project, rather 
than simply for a single new pier - prior to initiating the project 
"Construction and Operation of a Public Harbor Terminal for Tourist 
Cruises on the Island of Cozumel, State of Quitana Roo."119 
Cozumel is an island located in the Yucatan Peninsula about 40 miles 
south of CancunYo The waters off the island's southwest coast contain a 
large coral reef zone, the reefs of which are considered among the most 
118. This question will be difficult to address because aside from the many problems discussed 
in this paper, all the effects of NAFTA are simply not known. According to Scott Vaughan, the head 
of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program at the CEC, "it is highly unlikely that any method 
or approach can capture all environmental effects [caused by NAFr A], mainly because of the 
absence of aggregated indicators." (See Scott Vaughan, supra note 62) In the CEC study entitled 
Assessing Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement - An Analytical 
Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies published by the CEC Secretariat in 1999, at 37, the 
Secretariat reiterates the view that the "cumulative [environmental] impact. .. on the air, water, land 
and living things ... and the overall state of the entire ecosystem is of essential concern." The report 
further goes on to state that "however, at present, it is appropriate to focus individually on the major 
aspects of each separate component of the ambient environment .... [And] these selected indicators 
should cover both standard scientific measures and items of particular importance in patterns of 
North American environmental change." 
119. See CEC, supra note 50 at 8. 
120. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 47. 
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spectacular and biologically diverse in the world. 12I The goal of the 
project was to build a new cruise ship pier on Cozumel in order to 
increase tourism on the island.122 However, environmentalists believed 
that the construction and operation of the cruise ship pier would cause 
serious damage to many of the reefs, including those located in the 
Cozumel Marine Refuge. 123 
The submitters (petitioners) asserted that allowing the presentation of a 
"partial" environmental impact report with respect only to the new pier 
would undercut the purpose of the environmental impact evaluation by 
creating uncertainty with respect to the subject matter of the evaluation. l24 
The submitters also claimed that the environmental impact statement 
submitted by the developer was incomplete, and should have taken 
account of the projects directly related to the work or proposed activity, 
in order to evaluate the cumulative environmental impact these projects 
would have. 125 
The government of Mexico contended that the submission was improper 
because it challenged actions that took place before the NAAEC was in 
force, and that the NAAEC cannot be retroactive. 126 Therefore, Mexico 
asserted, the submission was outside the jurisdiction of the CEC.127 
Mexico also claimed that the submission was inadmissible under Article 
14 because the submitters did not certify their legal capacity, did not 
specify the damages they suffered, and did not exhaust all remedies 
available to them under Mexican law.128 And finally, Mexico disputed 
many of the factual assertions in the submission, claiming that the 
submitters failed to "establish a necessary relation between the alleged 
environmental damage to the flora and fauna ... and the alleged violation 
of environmentallaw."129 
The government of Mexico argued that the submitters failed to provide 
reliable evidence demonstrating the character of the organizations they 
12\. {d. 
122. {d. 
123. {d. 
124. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel. Quintana Roo, 
Secretariat of the CEC. 1997. at 4. httpllwww.cec.org. 
125. ld.atS. 
126. See CEC, supra note SO. at 8. 
127. [d. 
128. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters; Registry and Public Files of Submissions. Cozumel, at 2. 
httpllww.cec.orglcitizenlguides_registry. 
129. [d. 
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represented, and that they failed to demonstrate that the facts alleged 
constituted a direct transgression of the rights of the civil associations 
they purported to represent. 130 Mexico also argued that only one of the 
submitters (i.e., the Committee For the Protection Of Natural Resources, 
A.c.) availed itself of the popular complaint recourse, which itself is not 
an administrative recourse. In Mexico's view, this established that the 
submitters did not exhaust available remedies under the Mexican 
legislation. 131 With regard to the EIA, Mexico claimed that: 
- The authority in charge of evaluating the effects of the work 
for strictly environmental purposes did not regard the concession 
to build a new cruise ship pier on Cozumel as contemplating a 
comprehensive or global project,132 and that 
- The applicable Mexican law did not require an EIA in this 
situation.133 
The Secretariat recommended the preparation of a factual record, and by 
unanimous vote (Resolution 96-08), the Council asked the Secretariat to 
prepare one. 134 With regard to the consideration of facts prior to the 
enactment of the NAAEC, the Council directed that "in considering such 
an alleged failure to enforce effectively, relevant facts prior to January 1, 
1994 may be included in the Factual Record."135 The record included a 
clear summary of the contentions of the parties, which provided a record 
of Mexico's EIA statute. 136 However, no determination was ever made 
that Mexico was, in fact, in compliance with the applicable 
environmental laws. 137 
In this regard, some commentators have suggested that conclusions 
should be drawn from the factual records as to a party's effective 
enforcement of its environmental law.138 As one commentator has 
130. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana Roo, 
supra note 124, at 7. 
131. Id. 
132. [d. at 8. 
133. [d. at 9. According to the Government of Mexico, Article 28 states that "when an 
evaluation of the environmental impact of works or activities that are designed to develop natural 
resources is involved, the Ministry shall request the interested parties to include in the corresponding 
environmental impact report a description of possible consequences of these works or activities on 
the relevant ecosystem ... " and that this project was not "designed to develop natural resources." 
134. See CEC, supra note 50, at 8. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. at 9. 
138. Idat 13. 
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argued, "[Aside from] collect[ing] and summariz[ing] the arguments 
presented by the different parties, the CEC Secretariat [has] made its own 
independent assessment of these procedural arguments, and has made 
[recommendations] on whether a Factual Record should be prepared. 
There is every reason to presume that the CEC Secretariat would 
demonstrate similar sound judgment and impartiality when providing an 
independent assessment of substantive allegations and responses."1J9 One 
factor to consider in accepting this determination would be the political 
repercussions and the public's view of a multinational trade council 
passing what might appear to be final judgment on a NAFTA party's 
domestic enforcement, and whether such political and public reactions 
would support or undermine the main purpose of the factual record to 
improve the enforcement of environmental legislation. 
In Be Hydro, the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (of Canada) and the (U.S.) 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earthjustice) filed a submission on 
behalf of B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, British Columbia 
Wildlife Federation, Trail Wildlife Associations, Steelhead Society, 
Trout Unlimited, Sierra Club, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's 
Association, and the Institute for Fisheries Resources with the CEC 
Secretariat alleging that Canada had failed to enforce Section 35( 1) of its 
Fisheries Act and utilize its powers under Section 119.06 of the National 
Energy Board Act to ensure the protection of fish and fish habitat in 
British Columbia's rivers from ongoing and repeated environmental 
damage caused by hydro-electric dams. l40 However, the Secretariat 
indicated to the Council that the factual record was appropriate only in 
respect to the alleged failure to effectively enforce Section 35 of the 
Fisheries Act. 141 
Section 35 of the Fisheries Act provides that "No person shall carry on 
any work or undertaking that results in the harmful alteration, disruption 
or destruction of fish habitat."142 The submitters claimed that 
notwithstanding this provision, BC Hydro, which is a Crown corporation 
wholly owned by the government of the Province of British Columbia, 
139. See CEC - Comments on Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and IS 
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Draft Report to the CEC 
Council), Paul Kibel- RE: Comments On Draft of JPAC's Lessons Learned Report On Effectiveness 
of NAAEC's Citizen Submission Process, May 10, 2001, at 7, 
http://www.cec.orglwho_we_are/jpac/comments/lessons. 
140. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters; Registry and Public Files of Submissions, Be Hydro, at 1. 
httpllww.cec.orglcitizenlguidesJegistry. 
141. Id. at 10. 
142. See CEC, supra note 50, at 5. 
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had only "laid two charges" against BC Hydro since 1990, even though 
there was clear and well-documented evidence that BC's operations had 
damaged fish habitat on numerous occasions.143 Furthermore, the 
submitters asserted that BC Hydro had consistently and routinely 
violated Section 35( I), and that the regular operation of its dams caused 
consistent and substantial damage to fish and fish habitat. 144 
The submitters claimed that the damage caused by Be Hydro's operation 
of the dam included contributing to the extinction of many fish stocks, 
the decline of an even greater number of stocks that are at risk of 
extinction, and harming human populations that depend on the fisheries 
for their livelihoods and cultural identities. 145 This damage, according to 
the submitters, was done in at least seven ways, including reduced flows, 
rapid flow fluctuation, inadequate flushing flows, altered water quality, 
entrainment,'46 flow diversion, and reservoir draw down. '47 
In its response, Canada claimed that it was effectively enforcing its 
environmental laws, and that the submitters' definition of "effective 
enforcement" was much too limited in that it "[equated] enforcement 
directly with legal and judicial sanctions."'48 Canada claimed that under 
Article 5 of the NAAEC, "enforcement encompasses actions broader 
than just prosecution and provides a non-exhaustive list of appropriate 
enforcement actions,"'49 and that it had "determined that compliance 
activities ranging from voluntary compliance and compliance agreements 
to legal and judicial sanctions were the most productive in terms of 
143. See Factual Record For Submission SEM·97-OOJ, Secretariat of the CEC, May 30, 2000, 
at 7, http/www.cec.org. 
144. /d. at II. 
145. /d. 
146. Entrainment is one of the three distinct processes involved in erosion. It is the process of 
particle lifting by an agent of erosion. 
147. /d. 
148. [d. at 13. 
149. Jd. The definition of "Government Enforcement Action' in Article 5 of the NAAEC 
includes actions 'such as (a) appointing and training inspectors; (b) monitoring compliance and 
investigating suspected violations, including through on-site inspections; (c) seeking assurances of 
voluntary compliance and compliance agreements; (d) publicly releasing non-compliance 
information; (e) issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement procedures; (f) 
promoting environmental audits; (g) requiring record keeping and reports; (h) providing or 
encouraging mediation and arbitration services; (i) using licenses, permits or authorizations; (j) 
initialing in a timely manner judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek 
appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and regulations; (k) 
providing for search, seizure or detention; or (I) issuing administrative orders, including orders of a 
preventative, curative or emergency nature." 
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providing for the long-term protection of the environment with respect to 
fish and fish habitat."15o 
Canada asserted that its findings suggested that voluntary compliance, 
negotiation, publicity, and persuasion often made more compelling 
enforcement unnecessary, that it would continue to pursue different 
compliance promotion strategies, and that it would not hesitate to utilize 
the full power of its laws to protect fish and fish habitat where it is 
deemed necessary. 151 Furthermore, "enforcement through prosecutions 
would be a last resort after cooperation and persuasion [had] 
failed ... [since] immediate and widespread use of prosecution would be 
ineffective and counter productive."152 
The Secretariat made a recommendation to the Council to prepare a 
factual record since "additional information was required before an 
evaluation could be made that Canada was enforcing Section 35(1),"153 
and by unanimous vote (Council Resolution 98-07), the Council directed 
the Secretariat to prepare a factual record absent matters pending before 
the Court of Appeal in British Columbia. l54 In preparing the factual 
record, the Secretariat used the information collection methods 
prescribed by the NAAEC,155 requested information from the JPAC and 
an established expert panel to assist in the process, conferred with 
stakeholders prior to submitting its report, developed a scope of injury 
report to focus the inquiry, requested additional information from the 
JPAC when an insufficiency of information was discovered, and 
included a history of hydroelectric projects in British Columbia and their 
impact on fish and habitat in the factual record. l56 However, as with the 
Cozumel case, no determination was ever made as to whether Canada 
was effectively enforcing its environmentallaws.157 
A review of the Cozumel and BC Hydro factual records exposes a mixed 
bag of substantive and procedural events driven by the NAAEC 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. 
153. The author is somewhat befuddled by this part of the CEC's Lessons Learned Report. As 
previously discussed, the recommendation to enable the inclusion in the factual record the 
determination of whether a particular environmental law is actually being enforced is on the table. 
This statement made by the CEC suggests that the Secretariat was actually intending to make such a 
determination, which it never did, and likely never intended to do. 
154. See CEC, supra note 50, at 6. 
155. This included requesting information from the submitters and Canada in the form of 
written and oral testimony, and allowing the stakeholders three months to make written submissions. 
156. See CEC, supra note 50, at 7. 
157. /d. 
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submission process itself. Substantively, what appears to be evident in 
these cases is the CEC's exhaustive effort to create a complete and 
unbiased record of facts, arguments, law, and supportive expert and 
scientific evidence pertaining to each submission. However, 
notwithstanding these many pages of text contained within these two 
factual records, some critical questions continue to echo: 
- To what extent does the factual record contain valuable 
interpretation, processing, and assessment of all the relevant 
data? 
- Has the role of the CEC in the development of factual records 
become one merely of data gathering and limited information 
distribution? 
- And if so, what then can we expect of the significance and 
impact of a factual record given the modest level of substantive 
interpretation and evaluation so far included in these factual 
records?'58 
The Cozumel and BC Hydro cases also emphasize several procedural 
issues worth mentioning. In BC Hydro, the confidentiality provisions of 
Article 39 and 42 were asserted, relating to the confidentiality of 
proprietary information or concerns about national security.'59 BC Hydro 
has become typical of the increasing number of responses asserting 
similar confidentiality claims, and many commentators have expressed 
some concern over the abuse of these provisions. '60 Opportunities to 
assert the confidentiality privilege should be clearly and narrowly 
defined. 161 
Secondly, in both the Cozumel and BC Hydro cases, the Council had the 
authority under the NAAEC Article 15(7) to decide by a two-thirds 
majority vote whether to make the factual record available to the 
public. '62 The power to withhold submission information from the public 
has been criticized as being in direct conflict with established 
158. The author strongly. agrees with Professor KibeI's recommendation to allow for 
conclusions to be drawn by the CEC. If for nothing else, the CEC's level of information gathering, 
analysis, and expertise exhibited in these two factual records demonstrate clearly that the CEC's 
conclusions would add much value to the factual record, and could be used as the NAFfA parties 
saw fit As has already been mentioned, the factual record has no binding legal effect, unlike the 
arbitration panels' decisions in the Chapter 11 cases discussed later. 
159. [d. at 11. 
160. /d. 
161. /d. 
162. [d. 
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international principles of transparency and undermines efforts to build 
public confidence in the NAAEC submission process. In the author's 
view, provisions should be made within the NAAEC to allow for the 
publication of some version of every factual record, absent any sensitive 
and confidential information. 
In the Cozumel case, the CEC found that ". . . events or acts concluded 
prior to January 1, 1994 may create conditions or situations which give 
rise to current enforcement obligations. It follows that certain aspects of 
these conditions or situations may be relevant when considering an 
allegation of a present, continuing failure to enforce environmental 
law."163 On the issue of standing and direct injury, the Secretariat noted 
the "[importance] of the resource in question" and concluded that the 
"public nature of the marine resources [brought] the submitters within 
the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the NAAEC."I64 And on the 
requirement of exhaustion of remedies, the Secretariat concluded that 
"under the circumstances the submitters attempted to pursue local 
remedies, primarily by availing themselves of the denuncia popularl65 
administrative procedure."I66 
Now left with a discussion of how successful the NAFfA Environmental 
Framework has been based on the review of recent environmental 
studies, for at least two years, environmentalists and other NGO's 
demanded that NAFf A should have included requirements for extensive 
environmental impact studies before development, and for the imposition 
of trade sanctions against companies that failed to comply with 
environmental laws.167 On the one hand, economic studies were 
performed prior to NAFT A ratification in an effort to assess the 
economic benefits to be gained by the treaty.l68 However, in contrast, 
many critical inquiries over the potential environmental effects of 
NAFf A were never addressed, contributing to many concerns that 
remain unsettled to this day.169 Consequently, most of the NAFfA 
163. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 62. 
164. Id. 
165. Denuncia popular is a "complaint of the people." 
166. Id. 
167. See Baker and McKenzie, supra note 3, at 248. 
168. Along with studies already cited, at least one government study by the rrc, "Economy-
Wide Modeling of the Economic Implications of a FfA with Mexico and a NAFfA with Canada 
and Mexico," is mentioned by the General Secretariat, supra note 22, Ch. 1, Pt. 2, at 9. 
169. A few environmental studies were conducted prior to NAFfA. (For example, see G.M. 
Grossman and A.B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a Nonh American Free Trade Agreement, in 
THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (P. Barder ed., Cambridge MIT Press 1993); however, 
none were ever required by NAFf A. 
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environmental studies are now being performed in hindsight, perhaps 
after some irreversible damage has already been done. 170 
In the words of the CEC Secretariat, "changes in human health can serve 
as an indicator of change in the ambient environment."171 Following this 
line of reasoning, the author will therefore start the discussion on 
NAFf A environmental effects with a public citizen report, which among 
other things alleges that the high NAFf A price tag regrettably includes 
human casualties. The public citizen report is also offered first simply 
because analysis on the human element of the NAFf Alenvironment 
connection is missing from almost all of the reports that were reviewed 
for this paper.172 While the author will not try to guess the reason as to 
why this dimension was seemingly overlooked, it is not hard to argue 
that human concerns are also important when attempting to assess the 
post-NAFfA state of the environment. A short discussion on the CEC's 
"Analytical Framework For Assessing Environmental Effects" also 
170. The issue of the insufficiency of environmental studies was brought up at the NACEC 
First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment 
held on October 11 and 12, 2000 in Washington D.C. In the Closing Session, Konrad von Moltke, 
Senior Advisor for the International Institute for Sustainable Development commented that the 
NACEC needed to find better incentives to promote more and better studies by the academic 
community on this subject so that the NACEC could "draw on them." However, one academic 
commentator suggested that the political responsibility and burden is on the CEC to initiate and 
produce these studies. This finger pointing tends to support the view that NAFf A should have 
required environmental impact studies. In addition, one of the studies to be discussed later was very 
critical of CEC environmental testing "after the fact." See Christine Elwell, LL.B., LL. M., Sierra 
Club of Canada, NAFfA Effects on Water: Testing for NAFfA Effects in the Great Lakes Basin, 
CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages Between Trade and 
Environment - Papers, at http;:lIwww.cec.orglsymposium. According to the study, "if trade 
liberalization is truly to progress without significant damage to the environment, it is not enough to 
create a CEC Framework for testing NAFf A effects that can identify and perhaps even mitigate 
damaging processes that are already underway. The environmental impact assessment process 
should incorporate models of testing a process prior to initiation, and it should have standards by 
which to judge actions that will have an effect on the environment. Given that no detailed indicators 
are in place six years after the acceptance of NAFf A indicate that the general statements of desire 
for sustainable development in NAFfA are an accession to a minority of concern." 
171. See Assessing Environmental Effects of the Nonh American Free Trade Agreement - An 
Analytical Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies, supra note 118, at 37. 
172. The CEC website has a whole section devoted to Pollutants and Health at 
http://www.cec.orglprograms_projects/pollutants_health. My point concerns whether environmental 
harm and human harm can and should be completely separated and reported in this manner, since 
they too are linked. Some inconsistencies were encountered as a result of this health/environment 
division. For example, one environmental report concludes that no environmental harm has been 
caused by NAFfA in the U.S. Yet this whole CEC section deals with health problems caused by 
NAFfA environmental pollution. At a minimum, shouldn't environmental reports comment on, or 
try to reconcile the results of their studies with any applicable findings related to health? Or does the 
precise nature of academic studies provide justification for not reporting on this connection when 
human health is not the topic? 
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follows the public citizen report,173 since the framework has provided a 
sound methodology for the development of some recent environmental 
studies. And finally, an analysis and summary of these important 
environmental studies concludes this section. 
Public Citizen alleges NAFf A failures in protecting the environment, 
public health, and enforcing the NAFfA environmental provisions. 174 
Not entirely inconsistent with the studies to be discussed later, Public 
Citizen further alleges: 
- A 37 % increase in border maquiladoras at the NAFf A five-
year mark, leading to increased air and water pollution, and 
devastating population growth not sustainable under the current 
infrastructure; 
- A 50 % increase in hazardous waste transports into the United 
States since 1996, expected to increase as the number of 
maquiladoras continues to climb under NAFf A; 
- Increased toxic waste dumping, much of which IS 
maquiladora waste still unaccounted for; 
- Lack of promised clean up of 6,000 metric tons of lead 
remaining at the Metales y Derivados cite in Tijuana, owned by 
San Diego-based New Frontier Trading Corp.: 
- Lack of sewage treatment to handle a 54 % increase in the 
population of the city of Juarez, based on NAFf A growth; 
- Increased air pollution on the U.S.-Mexican border due to a 
surge in truck traffic with a 19 % increase in traffic at the Texas 
border, and doubling of the number of trucks entering the U.S. at 
San Diego. 
But perhaps more importantly, the public Cluzen report alleges that 
NAFf A has also caused large increases in Hepatitis A outbreaks due to 
contamination of the Rio Grande River, border birth defect clusters 
which are almost twice the national average in Cameron County, Texas, 
and an increase in birth defects at the Cameron CountylMatamoros 
173. In all fairness, it appears that the Public Citizen Report did not follow the standards set 
forth in the CEC Analytical Framework. For one reason, the CEC Analytical Framework was not 
available when this study was done. Secondly, it is likely that the authors of the study were not 
concerned about waiting for a framework that was six-plus years in the making in order to perform a 
study on NAFf A environmental effects that could have been performed at any time. 
174. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at I, 2. 
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border correlated to increased industrial activity under N AFf A. 175 By the 
Secretariat's own threshold standard, these human health problems lend 
credence to the view that the NAFf A environmental record is not 
entirely without blemish, and that these problems need to be remedied, 
especially because of their dangerous effects on human health. 
In an effort "to contribute to an increased understanding of the possible 
effects of trade and related economic and institutional developments in 
North America," the CEC established a trilateral team of independent 
representatives from the three countries to develop an analytical 
framework for considering the environmental effects of NAFfA.176 The 
Council reported that "it is very important to note that any effort to 
determine the linkages between a trade agreement's provisions and 
environmental effects is an extremely difficult challenge."m In Phase I 
of the project beginning in 1995, the team focused on understanding the 
NAFf A trade and investment regime, and developing a preliminary 
analytic approach.t78 Phase n, the latest published report, builds on Phase 
I, "refined through extensive review and consultation."t79 
The CEC study first examines four major areas that can affect the natural 
environment, including the environmental context, the economic context, 
the social context, and the geographic context. lSO In the "NAFfA 
Connection" the study then examines the NAFf A components that relate 
to a particular issue, including NAFf A changes, NAFf A institutions, 
trade flows, transborder investment flows, and other economic 
conditioning factors. 181 The CEC study also examines "linkages to the 
environment," including production, management and technology, 
physical infrastructure, social organization, and government policy. 182 
The CEC study then recommends the identification of specific indicators 
that would be most useful in measuring NAFfA-induced effects. 183 
These indicators should include atmospheric quality indicators 
measuring urban air quality, acid rain, climate change and ozone 
depletion. Water quality indicators measuring water quality and quantity 
175. /d. at 10. 
176. See Assessing Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement - An 
Analytical Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies, supra note 118, at iv. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at v. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 5. 
181. Id. at 16. 
182. [d. at 27. 
183. [d. at 37. 
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in water ranging from irrigation to drinking water, and the measurement 
of pesticides and fertilizers, should also be included. Soil indicators 
should include those that measure soil erosion, soil runoff, fertilizer and 
pesticide buildup, and land overuse. l84 But perhaps the most important 
indicators suggested by the CEC study are those that measure biota, 
including species depletion, number of species at risk, rural to urban 
conversion of land, and forest indicators. 
The author's assessment of the CEC Analytic Framework is that there is 
little question that the study is comprehensive, based on work performed 
by a cross-national selection of experts and world-renowned authorities. 
The issues examined in the study are important to the understanding and 
development of a thorough process for measuring environmental harm. 18S 
The study will be helpful in many ways, not only for use in the 
evaluation of the NAFr A environment, but for future trade agreements 
that can utilize all or parts of the environmental framework as a model 
for their own assessments. But more importantly, one of the most 
valuable parts of the CEC study is the recommendations for 
improvement, which offer immediate and future recommendations to 
help preserve the environment. 
The North American Commission of Environmental Cooperation put the 
CEC Analytical Framework to work when it released its study in 1999, 
and solicited a public call for papers that resulted in the "First North 
American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade 
and Environment." The call for papers yielded 14 studies that were 
selected from 50 responses, and were presented at this symposium on 
October 11 and 12, 2000, at the World Bank in Washington D.C.186 
These papers highlight many important issues that are discussed below. 
B. RECENT ACADEMIC CRITICISM OF THE CEC PROCESS AND 
NAFr A CHAPTER 11 BASED ON NAFr A ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 
In the short time that the CEC analytical framework has been available, 
the environmental studies submitted to the CEC have already shed light 
on the overall NAAEC submission process and Chapter 11, and provide 
184. [d. at 39. 
185. Some commentators have recommended changes to the CEC Analytical Framework. A 
few of these recommendations are discussed in Part Vll. One area of concern is the addition of 
environmental indices that better reflect the overall condition of the environment. 
186. See CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between 
Trade and Environment Highlights from the Symposium, at 
http://www.cec.org/symposium/index.cfm. 
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some insight into the next generation of NAFf Nenvironment issues that 
need to be addressed. Of little surprise to many, most of the questions 
highlighted by the CEC studies have begged for answers since NAFfA's 
inception. That is, for the most part, these studies validate concerns that 
have been on record for quite some time. Likely, the next steps taken by 
the NAFf A governments to mitigate the environmental impact of 
NAFfA will include monitoring the extent of these problems, and 
hopefully taking immediate action against those problems that are more 
severe. 
A review of the studies presented at the CEC's first symposium has 
revealed (1) the existence of more evidence concerning the current 
difficulties encountered when developing environmental measures within 
the context of NAFfA and WTO trade law,181 (2) the constraints that 
NAFf A has placed on the ability of countries to adopt higher standards 
to protect human health and the environment because of Chapter 11,188 (3) 
the non-enforcement of environmental regulations in Mexico in at least 
one case study, supporting the pre-NAFfA predictions of many NAFfA 
critics,l89 and (4) the existence of a loophole that has already been stated 
many times in this paper - that environmentally necessary legislation 
may not exist,l90 thereby rendering the NAAEC submission process 
useless against these types of environmental abuses. 
With regard to Chapter 11, one study suggests that broader disciplines 
and wider interpretations of the NAFfA parties' investment obligations 
under Chapter 11 have increased the risk that environmental regulations 
187. See Howard Mann, International and Environmental Law and Policy, Ottawa, Canada, and 
Associate, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Trade and Investment Program, 
Assessing the Impact of NAFfA on Environmental Law and Management Processes, CEC - First 
North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment -
Papers, at http://www.cec.org/symposium. 
188. See Marisa Jacott, La Neta; Proyecto Emisiones, Cyrus Reed, Texas Center for Policy 
Studies, and Mark Winfield, Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, The Generation 
and Management of Hazardous Wastes and Transboundory Hazardous Waste Shipments between 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, 1990-2000, CEC - First North American Symposium on 
Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment Papers, at 
http://www.cec.org/symposium. 
189. See Andrea Abel, National Zwildlife Federation, and Travis Philips, The University of 
Texas at Austin, The Relocation of El Paso's Garment Stonewashing Industry and its Implications 
for Trade and Environment, CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the 
Linkages between Trade and Environment - Papers, at http://www.cec.org/symposium. 
190. See Maria Teresa Guerrero and Francisco de Villa, Comision de Solidaridad y Defensa de 
los Derechos Humanos, A.C. and Mary Kelly, Cyrus Reed, and Brandon Vegter, Texas Center for 
Policy Studies, Austin Texas, The Forestry Industry in the State of Chihuahua; Economic. 
Ecological and Social Impacts post-NAFfA, CEC - First North American Symposium on 
Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment Papers, at 
http;//www.cec.org/symposium. 
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will not survive NAFfA and WTO trade law challenges. '91 However, 
this study optimistically suggests that developing environmental 
regulations that are valid under evolving trade law is possible, since there 
are no inherent inconsistencies between the two requirements.192 Lastly, 
this study recommends that NAFf A Chapter 11 does not have to be 
changed to address the increasing scope and negative effect on 
environmental law of many of these investment provisions.193 Rather, 
interpretive language could be inserted to clarify the meaning of these 
terms (i.e., expropriation, performance requirements, etc.).I94 Along these 
same lines, the author would further recommend investigating the 
possibility of using interpretive language to clarify other parts of the 
NAFfA instrument so that other necessary environmental regulations 
can more easily be implemented under those provisions. '95 
Another study provides more evidence that Chapter 11 is stifling the 
development of environmentally necessary legislation. '96 By examining 
the movement of hazardous waste between the NAFT A parties, this 
study suggests that U.S. waste exports to Canada and Quebec have 
dramatically increased (partially because of a weakened regulatory 
191. See Mann, supra note 187, at 1. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. /d. 
195. Using a constitutional law tenn to make this point, domestic environmental measures in 
the backdrop of international agreements have often been ruled invalid because of "strict scrutiny" 
interpretations made by trade tribunals. That is, in most cases, the purpose of the environmental 
regulation and the method of addressing that particular purpose is so "strictly scrutinized" that the 
environmental regulation is almost never found consistent with trade law. For example, see NAFfA 
Chapter Twenty-One: Exceptions, Article 2101(2), which states that "such [environmental measures 
and those measures outlined in Article 2101(1)] [are General Exceptions to the NAFfA Agreement] 
provided that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
ARBITRARY or UNJUSTIFIABLE discrimination .... " In the author's view, trade tribunals 
should take more into consideration the need for an environmental regulation when evaluating the 
alleged violator's method of addressing that need (i.e., when balancing interests). For instance, an 
environmental regulation instituted to protect the lives of citizens against an extremely dangerous 
chemical should not first and foremost be viewed as potentially discriminatory against foreign 
countries under Article 2101(2), and therefore invalid when determining whether the environmental 
or health regulation is justified under NAFf A trade law. The lives of citizens (i.e., the need for the 
regulation), and not the rights of foreign corporations should clearly carry more weight (or at least 
some weight) in this determination. In another example, NAFfA Article 1207 describes the use of 
"Quantitative Restrictions" between the parties. Quantitative restrictions are clearly discriminatory, 
yet the need to protect particular industries was considered important enough by the NAFf A parties 
to warrant discrimination in some cases. Protection of human life and the environment should also 
be considered important enough to balance in favor of environmental protection against some 
limited, and warranted discrimination. Therefore, perhaps an agreed-upon, more environmentally 
conscious interpretation of "ARBITRARY or JUSTIFIABLE discrimination" could be included in 
NAFf A to allow for the implementation of these types of necessary environmental and health-
regulated regulations. 
196. See Jacott et aI., supra note 188, at 1. 
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environment in those provinces) and that the development of higher 
standards to protect human health and the environment has been 
constrained because of the Chapter 11 Ethyl and Metalclad cases.191 This 
study supports the conclusions of many critics based on recent 
developments in the Chapter 11 cases discussed in Part VI. 
Other CEC studies reveal at least three NAAEC submission process 
weaknesses. One study of the relocation of El Paso's Garment 
Stonewashing Industry found that the existence of lower labor costs in 
Mexico was the overriding factor influencing relocation. 198 However, the 
lack of industrial pretreatment regulatory enforcement in Mexico has 
clouded this issue, since the amount of influence that this lack of 
enforcement had in the relocation decision is not known. While of 
greater concern is determining the scope of industry relocation attracted 
by the lack of environmental enforcement in Mexico, this study verifies 
one NAAEC submission process problem that has already been stated 
many times in this paper - that not all environmental enforcement 
violations are being reported and submitted to the CEC. 
Another study done on the Forestry Industry in the State of Chihuahua 
found that increases in U.S. imports of pulp and paper exerted pressure 
on the Chihuahua producers to keep prices low to maintain market share, 
and to oppose environmental regulations that increase the cost of doing 
business. l99 This study is important because it identifies two more 
conditions that the NAAEC submission process will not remedy; (1) the 
,-, exertion of political pressure NOT to establish environmentally 
necessary legislation; and (2) the CEC's inability to address 
environmental abuses based on environmental legislation that does not 
exist. 
In summary, a review of the first round of CEC studies has uncovered 
some evidence of potential CEC submission process and NAFT A 
Chapter 11 shortcomings that have long been voiced. In the author's 
view, more studies are required to discover the extent of the 
environmental non-enforcement problem occurring in Mexico, the 
amount and severity of environmental abuses taking place due to the lack 
of adequate environmental regulations, and the level of economic and/or 
political pressures being exerted to suppress environmentally necessary 
legislation. However, the CEC studies are more conclusive in showing 
197. [d. 
198. See Abel & Philips, supra note 189, at 1. 
199. !d. 
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that immediate action needs to be taken to remedy the effects of recent 
Chapter 11 cases to allow for the development of stronger environmental 
regulations in the shipment of hazardous wastes, and in other areas 
concerning human health and the environment. 
VI. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF CRITICAL NAFfA 
CHAPTER 11 CASES 
Given the right to directly challenge a NAFf A party, an investor may 
request binding investor-to-state dispute resolution for monetary 
damages. Under NAFfA's dispute settlement provisions (contained in 
NAFfA Chapter 11, Section B), each disputing party may select an 
arbitrator from the tribunal membership, and a third arbitrator is selected 
by an arbitration body. However, since arbitration proceedings under 
Chapter 11 do not follow the established international norms of 
transparency, proceedings may secretly be withheld from the public, 
even though domestic taxpayers are ultimately held responsible for 
paying out any damages awarded.201l Therefore, except for cases made 
available by unofficial publication, it is unclear as to who and how many 
Chapter 11 challenges have actually been initiated and/or settled.201 
What is clear about the known cases is that they have stirred Chapter 11 
critics to become increasingly concerned about two major problems:202 
That Chapter 11 can undermine efforts to enact new laws and 
regulations in the public interest, in particular to protect the 
environment and human health; and 
200. Konrad von Moltke, Senior Advisor of the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, most accurately described this situation in the closing session of the CEC First Annual 
Symposium cited earlier: "[with regard to Chapterll] we don't know how to know what we need to 
know . . . ." Furthermore under the Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement Process, there are limited 
opportunities to appeal or review a decision. See Mann, supra note 8, at 11. 
201. See The Council Of Canadians, NAFfA's Big Brother: The Free Trade Area of the 
Americas and the Threat Of NAFTA-style 'Investor-State' Rules, March 20, 2001, at 2. This source 
also claims that only fifteen Chapter 11 cases have been made pUblic. 
202. See Mann, supra note 8, at 1. At least one participant of the CEC's First Annual 
Symposium somewhat disagreed with some of the current concerns over NAFfA Chapter 11. 
Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Economics, stated at the Symposium's 
closing session that he believes that a more thorough and complete understanding of the decisions in 
the Chapter II cases is required, and that anecdotal evidence such as provisions that have a "chilling 
effect on environmental regulations" is persuasive in nature, but not hard evidence appropriate for 
academic studies. 
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That Chapter 11 can require governments to pay 
compensation to polluters to stop polluting, even if their 
activities have an adverse impact on public health and welfare. 
In fact, as of March 2001, there have been ten cases brought against 
environmental and natural resource management measures, including 
cases involving hazardous waste management decisions, maintenance of 
clean drinking water, and gasoline additives barred in other 
jurisdictions.203 The NAFfA parties recognized these concerns earlier, 
and by June 1999, efforts were being made to discuss NAFTA Chapter 
11 among the NAFTA environment ministers (i.e., the governing council 
to the CEC).204 And by the end of 2000, trade ministers and trade-
focused observers were recognizing the problems as well.lOs But as of 
this writing, nothing has been made available on the CEC website 
explaining the status or content of any current talks on possible Chapter 
11 modifications, or the prospects for making any of these recommended 
changes.206 
Available data was reviewed for five cases, and a synopsis of each case 
is included here to illustrate the extensive rights of NAFf A investors and 
their overreaching effect on the NAFTA parties. Two disputes involve 
the United States, one dispute involves Mexico, and two disputes involve 
Canada. Among these cases, three investors attacked domestic 
environmental regulations (Ethyl, Metalclad, and Methanex), one 
investor attacked a public agency (UPS), and one investor attacked a· 
Party's sovereign domestic judicial system (the Loewen Group). Both 
U.S. cases bring up U.S. constitutionality issues, which are discussed in 
Part VII. 
The two non-environment cases (Loewen and UPS) are included here to 
illustrate their effects on public health and safety. The decisions in these 
two cases may provide more ammunition for foreign investors to attack 
even more environmental regulations in the years to come. 
203. [d. at 15. • 
204. [d. at 16. 
205. [d. In his response to questions submitted to him specifically for this paper on June 12, 
2001, Scott Vaughan, the head of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program at the CEC has 
verified that recommendations to revise Chapter 11 have come from all three NAFf A parties, and 
from various NGO's including the Sierra Club of Canada, and the Institute of Sustainable 
Development. 
206. The CEC website is located at http://www.cec.org, although it is unclear whether Chapter 
II issues/events would be posted there based on the NAFfA parties' stance on keeping Chapter 11 
and NAAEC environmental issues separate. (See discussion on page 19.) 
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In Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (Notice of Arbitration: April 14, 1997), 
the first suit initiated under NAFf A Chapter 11 ,207 Ethyl, a Virginia 
corporation, fIled a claim against Canada for $250 million in damages. 
Ethyl produces a toxic gasoline additive called methylcyclopentadienyl 
manganese tricarbonyl ("MMT"), and then ships the substance to 
Canada, where it is mixed and sold to Canadian gas refiners. In April 
1997, Canada imposed a ban on the import and inter-provincial trade of 
MMT, which was intended to protect public health, since MMT contains 
manganese, a known human neurotoxin.208 The law did not directly ban 
the sale or use of MMT in Canada, urging some to argue that the law was 
discriminatory. 209 
Under the NAFfA provisions, Ethyl claimed that Canada's ban on MMT 
amounted to "expropriation" under Article 110 because it would 
eliminate profits Ethyl expected to earn through Canadian sales of the 
additive.210 Ethyl further alleged that the ban was an illegal "performance 
requirement" under Article 1106 because it would force the company to 
build a factory in every Canadian province since the regulation made 
importation of MMT illegal.211 And finally, Ethyl alleged that Canada's 
ban on MMT in the absence of a ban on internal production and sale was 
a breach of its obligation to treat foreign and domestic investors in a no 
less favorable manner under Article 1102.212 
In July 1998, Canada settled with Ethyl,213 agreeing to several troubling 
conditions. Under the settlement decree, Canada ended up paying Ethyl 
Corporation $13 million for lost costs and profits, removed the ban on 
MMT, and made a public apology to Ethyl for implying that Ethyl's 
product was hazardous.214 In essence, Ethyl was able to intimidate 
Canadian lawmakers into rescinding a valid environmental regulation, 
which resulted in the Canadian taxpayer "paying off the polluter" for 
importing a dangerous chemical.215 The use of Chapter 11 to lobby 
207. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Another Broken NAFfA Promise: Challenge by 
U.S. Corporation Leads Canada to Repeal Public Health Law, at 2, 
httpllwww.citizen.org!pctradeJnaftalcases/ethyl.htm. 
208. See NAFfA's Corporate Lawsuits, A Briefing Paper, Friends Of The Earth and Public 
Citizen. April 1999, at 2; http/!:www.tradewatch.orgINAFTNCases/fancy.pdf.This source further 
states that both the EPA and the State of California have also banned the use of MMT, lending 
credence to the view that the Canadian ban on MMT was legitimate. 
209. See Mann, supra note 8, at 71. 
210. See Public Citizen, supra note 207, at 2. 
211. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen. supra note 208, at 2. 
212. See Mann, supra note 8, at 71. 
213. [d. 
214. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 2. 
215. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 2. 
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against valid environmental legislation in this case set a major precedent 
for the cases to follow.216 
In Metalclad V. Mexico (Notice of Arbitration: January 13, 1997), an 
American corporation filed a Chapter 11 claim against Mexico for $90 
million.217 Metalclad took over a waste disposal plant facility in San Luis 
Potosi, which had a history of contaminating local groundwater.218 The 
company had hopes of building and operating a full hazardous waste 
landfill facility, for which municipal permits for that purpose had been 
previously denied.219 The federal government in Mexico issued the 
required permits from that level, without prejudice to other 
authorizations that might be required at the local level, and promised the 
company that all permits were either issued or would be issued without a 
problem. 220 
Local citizens, concerned about the government's failure to impose 
environmental laws and regulations, opposed Metalclad's plans to re-
open and continue running the disposal plant. 221 The required municipal 
permits were finally denied in December 1995, thus ending the final 
construction and preventing any operation of the landfill.222 Because of 
the locals' involvement and concern, the state governor then declared the 
site part of an ecological zone.223 
Metalclad, claiming that the governor's declaration amounted to 
"expropriation" under Article 1110,224 sued Mexico for $90 million, an 
amount that is more than the combined annual income of all the residents 
in the surrounding area.225 The company also alleged that Article 1105 
was violated.226 The Tribunal decided in favor of Metalclad (awarding 
216. See Mann, supra note 8, at 74. 
217. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Our Future Under the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, at 2, http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafialcases/metalcla.htm. 
218. [d. 
219 .. See Mann, supra note 8, at 74. 
220. [d. 
221. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5. 
222. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75. 
223. See WTO - The NAFTA Ruling On MetalClad vs. Mexico, at 4. 
224. The NAFTA Tribunal ruled that Article 1110 was violated because no compensation was 
paid; expropriation could include "covert or incidental interference with the use of property;" and the 
purpose of the government measure need not be considered in this regard. See Mann, supra note 8, 
at 77. 
225. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 3. 
226. The Tribunal ruled that Article 1105 was breached in several ways including not living up 
to federal and state official representations; not clarifying understandings of Mexican law; not 
having procedures for investors to easily know the rules on permits - breaching the transparency 
obligations in non-Chapter II parts of NAFT A; ruling that environmental factors were a federal and 
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them $16.7 million in damages on August 30,2000) citing three NAFfA 
objectives that needed to be adhered to227, and even went so far as to 
proclaim that environmental impact considerations, public opinions, and 
the past record of performance of the proponent were matters outside the 
jurisdiction of Mexican local government.228 
The Tribunal further ruled that Mexican officials told Metalclad that 
municipal permits were not necessary to build or operate the landfill, 
despite Mexican submissions that no such assurances were offered, and 
that the company relied upon and acted on these representations.229 
Furthermore, the NAFf A Tribunal held this proceeding in secrecy, did 
not allow testimony from local people or environmental experts, and did 
not even allow the concerned parties to review the original arguments 
filed by Metalclad.230 
The Tribunal's ruling in Metalclad has brought several critical Chapter 
11 issues to the forefront. In particular,231 
- What is the extent of the transparency and other procedural 
requirements to be accorded an investor under Article 1105? 
- Do the decisions of government officials at one level have a 
binding effect on officials at another level with regard to 
NAFfA investors? 
- What is the scope of the Tribunal's ability to rule on domestic 
law? 
- What effect does the need to consider the purpose of a 
measure have on the determination of "expropriation"? 
The answers to these questions will likely impact future NAFf A Chapter 
11 cases for years to come. 
not a local issue; and not notifying Metalclad of the relevant town meeting concerning its permit. 
(See Howard Mann, supra note, 8 at 75.) Also, these types of Chapter II decisions can be 
contrasted with the CEC's reluctance to make detenninations on environmental enforcement. 
227. The three NAFfA objectives on which the Tribunal based its opinion are transparency in 
government regulations and activity; the substantial increase in investment opportunities; and the 
assurance of a predictable commercial framework for investors. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75. 
228. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 4. 
229. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75. 
230. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 4. The Tribunal justified 
this secrecy citing the need for effective operation of the proceedings. See Mann, supra note 8, at 
77. 
231. See Mann, supra note 8, at 78. 
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In UPS V. Canada (Notice of Arbitration: April 19, 2000), UPS, the giant 
U.S. courier company, accused the Canada Post of giving preferential 
access to its national network, and alleged $156 million in damages.2.l2 
UPS is alleging an Article 1102 violation because Canada Post does not 
provide UPS with access to its retail and service infrastructure that is 
equal to what it provides its own courier operations.23J UPS is also 
alleging an Article 1105 violation because the government is using its 
courier monopoly to engage in anti-competitive practices towards its 
competitors.214 Furthermore, UPS is alleging that Canada itself has 
violated NAFf A Article 1503 by failing to effectively control its own 
government monopolies. m 
According to trade lawyer Steven Shrybman, UPS is using NAFfA to 
expand its corporate empire by eliminating public sector competition for 
mail and courier services.236 UPS is claiming that the Canada Post has 
taken unfair advantage of its mail service monopoly to support its 
competitive parcel and courier delivery business, which occurs today in 
most areas of public sector service delivery.237 In fact, most private sector· 
corporations have been complaining for decades about "unfair 
competition" from public service providers.238 . 
However, if UPS succeeds in having one public sector monopoly 
declared invalid under NAFfA Chapter 11, this would provide ample 
ammunition for other investors to attack a wide range of public 
infrastructures including Medicare, education, transportation, sewer and 
water services, and dozens of other public services.239 Consequently, 
UPS's efforts could dramatically expand the ambit of the investor-state 
apparatus to include NAFf A requirements that should not be subject to 
foreign investor claims.240 
The environmental link between the UPS case and the topic of this paper 
is that the increased exposure of public monopolies to Chapter 11 claims 
may limit the very use of these public infrastructures by their NAFf A 
party owners, thereby leading to less controlled and less standardized 
public services. The potential development of a more chaotic, lower-
232. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5. 
233. See Mann, supra note 8, at 107. 
234. /d. 
235. [d. 
236. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5. 
237. [d. 
238. [d. 
239. [d. 
240. [d. 
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quality, foreign-investor infested public service sector could lead to 
disastrous environmental, public health, and public welfare 
consequences. 
Canadian companies have not excluded themselves from attempting to 
exploit NAFTA investor protections. In Methanex v. U.S. (Notice of 
Arbitration: December 3, 1999), Methanex, a Vancouver-based company 
that produces methanol, is suing the U.S. for $970 million over a 
California decision to phase out the use of MTBE, one of the company's 
products, by 2002.241 California issued its phase-out decision after 
discovering that MTBE was leaking into the ground water of Santa 
Monica and Lake Tahoe, and into 10,000 wells throughout California.242 
California also cited an EPA report that MTBE causes tumors in rats.243 
Methanex is now claiming that the California phase-out amounts to 
expropriation under Article 1110 due to the company's loss of expected 
future business profits, and the $150 million loss of Methanex stock 
value in the ten days following California's announcement.244 The 
Methanex case falls in line with other NAFT A disputes attempting to 
capitalize on the expanded meaning of "expropriation" within the 
NAFT A legal sense. 
Methanex is also claiming the U.S. violated Article 1102 based on the 
assertions that Archer-Daniels-Midland, a competitor that manufactures 
ethanol, a product that now stands to gain from the MTBE ban, 
contributed to the campaign of the current California Governor. This led 
to Governor Gray Davis' successful advocacy of the MTBE ban, and 
thus created a discriminatory process and outcome. 245 
Furthermore, Methanex is claiming that the U.S. violated Article 1105, 
stating that: 246 
- The MTBE ban was the result of a flawed process in which it 
was denied due process leading to a failure to consider 
alternatives on banning MTBE; 
241. [d. 
242. [d. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. 
245. See Mann, supra note 8, at 97. 
246. [d. 
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- Unfair and non-transparent lobbying determined the decision; 
and 
- The measure was a disguised restriction on trade that was not 
the least trade-restrictive option available. 
A NAFT A Tribunal hearing on an amended Methanex claim, and the 
U.S.'s objection to jurisdiction, was anticipated for June 2001,247 the 
results of which are not known at the time of this writing. 
Finally in Loewen Group, Inc. V. U.S. (Notice of Arbitration: October 30, 
1998), Loewen, a Canadian-based funeral conglomerate, is suing the 
U.S. for $725 million claiming that a Mississippi trial judge, verdict, 
bond requirement, and trial decision upheld by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court has violated the company's new investor rights guaranteed under 
NAFT A Chapter 1l,248 Loewen was sued by a small Mississippi funeral 
home owner for gross business misconduct.249 The Mississippi jury 
found Loewen liable for fraud, malicious business practices, and other 
misconduct, and imposed heavy punitive damages. Loewen settled the 
case for $150 million and promptly filed a $725 million suit against the 
U.S. in the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
("ICSID"), claiming NAFT A Chapter 11 violations.250 
Loewen alleges that the civil justice system in Mississippi violated 
international legal norms of "fairness," discriminating against the 
Canadian-based corporation. This amounts to "expropriation" (Article 
1110) and the "denial of justice" (Article 1102), both NAFTA Chapter 
11 violations.251 Loewen further claims that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court requirement for Loewen to post a 125% bond as applicable under 
state law also violated NAFT A by not specially exempting the company 
from the law. 252 In essence, Loewen is claiming that the very civil justice 
247. See Mann, supra note 8, at 96. The Methanex Chapter 11 case should not be confused 
with the Methanex CEC Submission (99-001), which has an entirely different disposition. 
248. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5. 
249. /d. 
250. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Briefing Paper, Canadian Corporation Found 
Liable in Mississippi Couns Uses NAFTA to Claim Legal System Violated Its Rights; at 1, 
http://www.citizen.orglpctradeinaftalcases!Loewen.htm. 
251. Id. at 2. 
252. [d. This bond requirement has been implemented in at least 20 other states so that the 
lengthy appeal process is not abused, and violating parties are not given the opportunity to hide 
assets. Loewen further claimed that the court's refusal to exempt the company from the bond, or 
even lower the bond amount, violated Article 1105, Minimum National Standards of Treatment. See 
Mann, supra note 8, at 104. 
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system itself - allowing jury trials - is violating the company's NAFf A-
guaranteed rights to fair and equal treatment and non-discrimination.253 
If Loewen is successful in its claim against the United States, investors 
would be encouraged to try to circumvent domestic law by filing 
NAFfA claims challenging the state, local, and federal court systems, 
where U.S. citizens and businesses must abide by U.S. court rulings.254 
Additionally, the Loewen case could effectively put an end to punitive 
damages against NAFfA investors25s, while foreign investors and their 
political allies could use NAFf A rights to fuel efforts to enact tort 
"reform" that further restricts citizens' access to the court systems.256 
These consequences could have a major impact on both NAFf A and 
domestic environmental litigation. Domestically, under one scenario, a 
NAFf A foreign investor could try to use Chapter 11 to shield itself from 
punitive damages assessed for severe environmental pollution. And 
within the NAFfA framework, using Chapter 11, a foreign investor 
might try to circumvent punitive damages sought by a NAFfA party 
through the domestic enforcement of environmental violations brought 
about by NAAEC submissions, which could render the NAAEC 
submission process ineffective in these cases. 
The determinations in all of the five cases described above challenge the 
effectiveness and fairness of the NAFfA investment provisions, and 
draw attention to special issues that need to be addressed in order to 
make NAFf A most beneficial to all stakeholders. While the Chapter 11 
investment protections have acted as an effective catalyst fostering many 
investment opportunities throughout the NAFf A territories, these 
protections should not be extended so far as to destroy necessary health, 
environmental, and judicial policies that protect the NAFf A citizens 
themselves. Part vn summarizes these problems and describes some 
possible solutions. 
253. /d. The author believes it is more accurate that some jury determinations - not jury trials 
themselves - could violate an investor's NAFfA guaranteed rights. However, even with this 
qualification, this result seems unacceptable. (I.e., NAFf A rights should not exempt foreign 
investors from the U.S. legal process.) 
254. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5. Also note that NAFfA 
creates a special right of appeal outside the U.S. legal system for any corporation that can define 
itself as foreign. 
255. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Briefing Paper, Canadian Corporation Found 
liable in Mississippi Courts Uses NAFFA to Claim Legal System Violated Its Rights, at 3. 
256. See Friends of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5. 
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VII. CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The constitutional validity of the NAFT A dispute resolution, especially 
under Chapter 11, Section B, is still open for debate. One concern is the 
extended meaning of "expropriation" in the NAFT A sense, and whether 
this interpretation can withstand U.S. constitutional scrutiny, where the 
meaning of "expropriation" (i.e., "takings" under the Fifth Amendment) 
is far more limited. Secondly, an issue arises as to whether a 
multinational review panel can replace ordinary judicial review, the 
decisions of which are never appealable to a U.S. COurt.257 Since 
members of the arbitration panel are chosen by the involved nations, the 
transfer of appellate jurisdiction to this arbitration panel from Article ill 
courts raises serious questions about whether this process deprives 
litigants of judicial review by an Article ill court,258 as dictated by the 
Constitution. 
Thirdly, the mandatory nature of NAFT A arbitration coupled with the 
secrecy of the proceedings and lack of transparency raises potential due 
process violations based on lack of "notice" and "opportunity to be 
heard," and the deprivation of a "full" and "fair" trial. In particular, there 
are no requirements to provide the public with information at various 
stages of the process, such as the notice of intent to litigate, the 
consultation process, or the initiation of litigation.259 In addition, 
governments are not required to make public the pleadings of the parties, 
and can even maintain secrecy of final awards.260 
In essence, negotiation of commercial disputes under NAFT A has 
extended into public policy negotiations, which take place solely 
between the government and foreign investors in a privileged and secret 
context.261 This gives foreign private interests an unhealthy privileged 
access to the policy-making process, without the accountability that 
comes from public release of the pleadings.262 
Aside from the constitutional issues specific to the U.S. that will be 
determined in their own due course, cross-national recommendations 
have been proposed by several critics that are surprisingly similar in 
257. See JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC 
RELATIONS 493 (West Publishing Company 1995). 
258. [d. 
259. [d. 
260. [d. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. 
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content and nature, perhaps due to the equal opportunity effort on record 
of companies from all three NAFf A parties seeking to maximize and 
exploit the benefits of NAFf A purely for their own personal gain. These 
recommendations along with some comments are summarized below: 
Eliminate the investor-state mechanism, which enables investors to 
bypass domestic court systems. Limit international commercial 
arbitration procedures to their intended purpose - to the adjudication of 
contract disputes, where the parties expressly consent to the specific 
dispute to arbitration.263 
Comments: This suggestion amounts to "throwing the baby out with the 
bath water." The author's view is that there are less destructive steps that 
can be taken to preserve the positive effects of this mechanism, such as 
the ones mentioned below. 
"Carve-out" (reserve an exception) for environmental protection, natural 
resource management, and conservation measures, by specifying 
"Notwithstanding ~y other provisions of the Agreement, a contracting 
party shall not be prevented from taking prudential measures with respect 
to environmental protection, resource management and conservation, and 
related health protection matters."264 
Comments: Since Article 1106 and 1110 already contain some of these 
exceptions, the recommendation is to re-interpret and extend the use of 
these exceptions, and develop better and more specific language (perhaps 
with the language stated above) to allow for the proper exercise of these 
exceptions. Interpretive language to clarify: National treatment in the 
environmental context, the relationship between environmental trade 
measures and performance requirements prohibited by NAFf A, and the 
scope of expropriation is likely a better alternative, since this would not 
require modifying Chapter 11.265 
"Carve-out" (reserve an exception) for measures related to health, 
education, and social services, to the effect that "Notwithstanding any 
other provisions of the agreement, a contracting party shall not be 
prevented from taking any measure with respect to the protection of 
263. See MAl - First Report - Summary of Recommendations, at 2, 
http://www.legis.gov.bc.caIcmtlmaill998I1reportlrecomm.htm. 
264. [d. at 4. 
265. See IISD, supra note 86, at 8. Also See Part V of this paper. 
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health and the provision of health, education, child care, and other social 
services. "266 
Comments: This recommendation represents a new exception, elevating 
the priority of health, education, and social services above investor 
economic benefit. The author's view is that this exception will likely 
never be implemented primarily because of the parties' fear of its use in 
implementing hidden protectionist measures. 
Modified provisions to exempt sanctions that are genuinely intended to 
promote respect for and enforcement of human rights must be effectively 
exempted, at all levels of government, from national treatment, most-
favored nation and any special provisions developed to deal with the 
issues of "extraterritoriality" or "secondary investment boycotts."267 
Comments: While this exemption is admirable from the human rights 
perspective, the author's view is that this exemption has virtually no 
chance of being implemented into NAFT A or any other trade agreement 
any time soon. This assessment is based on the presence of the generally 
narrow economic purpose for most trade agr~ements, national 
sovereignty issues that are continuing to arise with every trade 
agreement, and the difficulty in developing a minimum level of human 
rights that all parties could agree on. The use of these exceptions to 
implement hidden protectionist measures, and the difficulties in 
establishing an overseeing and/or enforcement mechanism would also 
likely cause major problems. 
The government of Canada and all NAFTA parties should ensure the 
incorporation of a narrowly defined concept of expropriation 10 any 
future negotiations with the WTO.268 
Comments: This suggestion doesn't address the current Chapter 11 
problems. One recommendation to do this might be to modify NAFT A 
Chapter 11 to include stricter language for expropriation, as the 
recommendation suggests for future negotiations. The author's view is 
that revising NAFT A Chapter 11 would be very difficult based on the 
events leading up to NAFTA's previous ratification. 
266. /d. 
267. Id. 
268. See Investment And Competition Policy Issues: What Canadians Are Saying, at 8; 
http://www.parl.gc.calInfoComDoc/3 ... IT/StudieslReportsIFaitrp09123.htm. 
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While much of the concern over NAFTA Chapter 11 has revolved 
around its effect on environmental regulations, most of the squabble over 
the NAAEC has been over the submission process itself, and whether the 
process has actually worked over the last seven years. But a lack of 
environmental emphasis seems evident. For example, Article 102 
outlines the NAFT A objectives, including the elimination of trade 
barriers, the protection of intellectual property rights, and promoting the 
increase of "investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties" -
all of which may be considered worthy free-trade policies. But no 
mention of any environmental objective is made in this provision. 
Perhaps Article 1 (a) of the NAAEC should have been included in 
Article 102 to promote the importance of environmental protection in the 
treaty.269 
Furthermore, given the slow and after-the-fact progress of the CEC 
studies assessing the environmental effects of NAFT A, in retrospect, 
perhaps NAFT A should have required impact and environmental effects 
studies, as many have already suggested. And lastly, including 
provisions in NAFTA to assess penalties to companies violating 
domestic environmental law may have curbed some corporate temptation 
to circumvent these laws for economic reasons.270 
With regard to the NAAEC submission process, the CEC solicited and 
received many public responses on how the submission process itself 
could be improved. The public call resulted in the development of the 
CEC Lessons Learned Report in April 2001, which recommended: 271 
Expedited review of Article 14 and 15 submissions - striving for a 60 
day Article 14( 1) and 14(2) review and a review of party responses 
within an additional 60 - 90 days; allowing up to 60 days for party 
responses; council authorization of the development of a factual record 
within 90 days; and completion of the entire process within two years 
from filing; and 
269. Article 1 (a) of the NAAEC reads: "[to] foster the protection and improvement of the 
environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations." 
270. The possibility of trade sanctions has also been explored for environmental and labor 
abuses. However, the concern here is that trade sanctions might be used as protectionist measures. 
See First North American Symposium, Closing Session, Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow, International 
Institute for Economics, at http://www.cec.org/symposiumlindex.cfm. But the possibility of 
assessing penalties and/or fines against abusers still appears to be on the table. 
271. See CEC, supra note 50, at 13-16. 
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Open, informed and reasoned decision-making - including access to the 
reasons why the Council decides not to accept the Secretariat's 
recommendation to develop a factual record; additional time for the 
submitter to respond to any additional information referred to by a party 
that is not on the original submission; and the reduction or removal of the 
30-day blackout period, which currently allows the responding party to 
become aware of a factual record recommendation before press inquiries 
begin. 
Professor KibeI has identified other important weaknesses in the 
NAAEC submission process that were not addressed by the CEC 
Lessons Learned Report.272 In particular, the JPAC did not include 
recommendations as to (a) the need to include findings and 
recommendations in factual records; (b) the need for procedures to 
remedy non-enforcement identified in factual records; and (c) the 
absence of conclusions regarding the CEC Council's unchecked 
authority to refuse to prepare or release factual records.273 
The author proposes that the CEC specifically address the 
recommendations dealing with preparation and release of factual records 
as follows: 
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the 
factors the CEC will consider when determining whether or not 
to produce a factual record (see supra footnote 54): and 
- Allow for the publication of some version of every factual 
record, balancing a NAFf A party's need for confidentiality and 
the public's right to be informed. 
The author also proposes three recommendations that have already been 
mentioned concerning the JPAC public review process: 
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the 
process and factors the JPAC will consider when determining the 
public review process it will follow when investigating a "public 
issue" (see supra footnote 76); 
272. See CEC - Comments on Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and IS 
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Draft Report to the CEC 
Council), Paul Kibel- RE: Comments On Draft of JPAC's Lessons Learned Report On Effectiveness 
of NAAEC's Citizen Submission Process, supra note 139, at 6. 
273. [d. 
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- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the 
process and factors the JPAC will consider when determining 
whether or not a public issue is "relevant" to the CEC 
submission process prior to submitting the issue to the CEC (see 
supra footnote 71): and 
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the 
process and factors that the CEC will consider when determining 
whether or not to address a public issue (see infra footnote 75). 
145 
Finally, since the CEC only has authority to review violations of 
domestic law, a party could circumvent CEC review simply by 
modifying or temporarily suspending their own domestic law.274 
Therefore, one recommendation might be to 1) add time constraints to 
Article 14 (3) (a) to allow the violating party a finite amount of time to 
domestically resolve the matter,27S and 2) allow the continuance of CEC 
review authority regardless of suspensions in domestic law, once initial 
CEC review authority has already been properly established.276 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As already described, the argument over NAFfA has continued to be 
vigorous. There is little question about the NAFfA parties' economic 
intent, particularly from the standpoint of trade barrier elimination and 
investor protections, and there is ample economic evidence supported by 
many academic studies suggesting that NAFf A has been beneficial to 
the economies of all three NAFf A parties. 
The NAFf A parties addressed environmental concerns by establishing 
the NAAEC, which provides for the CEC, the NAAEC submission 
process, and the JPAC public review process. In addition, the NAFf A 
parties granted strong investor provisions in NAFfA Chapter 11, in 
hopes of encouraging foreign investment for the purpose of fostering 
economic efficiency and development. 
However, the overall impact of NAFf A has not been without flaws. The 
NAFfA environmental provisions, which includes the NAAEC and its 
274. See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY 
1261 (Foundation Press 1998). 
275. The author is sure this recommendation would not fly because of the NAFfA parties' 
commitment to preserving national sovereignty -- something that this requirement could likely upset. 
276. Given that the factual record is non-binding, the CEC's assessment of the suspension as 
part of the factors evaluated in the factual record would be extremely valuable. 
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submission process, have been the subject of much concern. A review of 
over seven years of citizen submissions on enforcement matters and two 
factual records (Le., the Cozumel Reef and BC Hydro factual records) 
has resulted in recommendations for procedural improvements. 
Academic studies on NAFf A environmental effects have also spawned 
recent criticism, while providing initial evidence of both new and long-
suspected NAFfNNAAEC weaknesses. In addition, unprecedented 
investor provisions interpreted in the Chapter 11 cases have thus far 
proven to be overly protective of corporate investment, extending 
corporate power into the realm of public policy and national sovereignty, 
without the safeguards afforded by exposure to public scrutiny and 
public accountability. 
In the meantime, more and more NAFf A citizens and organizations are 
being galvanized by the secret and infrequent publications of NAFf A 
Chapter 11 litigation, which have so far resulted in skewed results 
favoring corporate actors over valid state interests. Furthermore, 
evidence on the environmental effects of NAFf A - and the effectiveness 
of the methods being used to address those effects - continues to mount, 
sending stronger and stronger signals to the NAFf A parties on 
improvements that need to be made and problems that need to be 
watched. 
The author believes that while economic progress sparked and 
maintained by corporate investment and free trade are important to 
achieving continued national growth and development, money and 
factories are not the only ingredients of an equitable society prospering 
in a sustainable environment. To move most effectively in this direction, 
the NAFf A parties need to re-evaluate the goals of NAFf A to somehow 
provide more than mushy rhetoric to each party's right and responsibility 
to protect the environment, manage and conserve its resources, initiate 
and establish health protection measures, and educate and provide health 
care and other social services for its citizens. 
From the standpoint of Chapter 11, the NAFf A instrumentation should 
provide explicit, interpreted, and enumerated rights to enable the 
development of these critical responsibilities, so that a NAFTA party is 
not punished for aspiring to better serve its own people. NAFT A 
renegotiation and/or insertion of interpretive provisions that fulfill a 
more balanced NAFT A objective with more reasonable and realistic 
priorities would serve the NAFT A parties well, and would make way for 
a longer lasting, more beneficial, and socially viable agreement that 
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substantively Improves the conditions of many more NAFf A 
stakeholders. 
With regard to the NAFf A environmental provlSlons, perhaps the 
obvious questions to ask now are "Where do we go from here?" and 
"What can be done with what have we learned?" Certainly 
environmental studies are underway, and questions are being asked about 
efficiency, effectiveness, and openness from the standpoint of past, 
present and future events. Some critics have argued that the CEC is no 
longer the institution to deal with NAFfA environmental issues, now 
that the "race to the bottom" is no longer the primary concern. 277 Yet 
other commentators have suggested that even though NAFfA and the 
CEC have not been perfect, much has already been accomplished - so 
that these institutions should now become the starting point for a bigger 
and better economically productive and environmentally sensitive 
agreement. 
As brought up by the environmental experts at the Next Steps Session of 
the First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages 
between Trade and Environment, there are many important issues that 
have yet to be explored. While many critical questions remain 
unanswered, two key issues are discussed below.278 
1. Is process enough to protect the environment? 
Comments: In the author's view, process is not enough to protect the 
environment. A reliable process may lead to a consistent level of 
environmental protection, given that the necessary tools are in place to 
make needed process corrections. In terms of NAFfA, it seems clear 
that a platform has now been established to identify and measure the 
actual environmental effects of NAFf A (via the CEC Symposium and 
the CEC Environmental Framework). Tools are also in place to improve 
the overall CEC submission process and address issues arising from 
NAAEC Articles 14 and 15 (via the JPAC public review process). 
277. One commentator has suggested that a "blue sky" (less constrained?) organization might 
now be needed. 
278. Other Symposium "Next Step" questions included (l)What kind of CEC focus is required 
to work within its own budget constraints? (2) What can be done to provide more funding for the 
infrastructure upgrades that are necessary to protect the environment? (3) How do we better balance 
public and private interests? (4) Can we focus on "Why the CEC is working?" rather than "Why the 
CEC is not working?" and (5) how can we parse economic and environmental protectionism? 
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Given that reviews could be implemented to determine whether this 
process itself is being followed (perhaps this type of review could be 
done at the newly-formed CEC Symposium or some other meeting done 
at appropriate frequencies), this could lead to a consistent level of 
environmental protection constrained by at least two major limitations. 
One limitation discussed previously is that the primary objective of the 
NAAEC is not to protect the environment, but to maximize the 
enforcement of environmental regulations. This objective creates an 
inherent discrepancy between the CEC's quest posed by this question to 
protect the environment, and the NAAEC's fundamental design. 
Secondly, the weak enforcement tools established by the NAAEC 
available to the CEC are misaligned to handle environmental harm 
because of this discrepancy. Therefore, in summary, the overall CEC 
process could be optimized to identify NAFT A effects on the 
environment, and to set in place a process improvement mechanism that 
would protect the environment only so far. However, the CEC does not 
have adequate powers to initiate the changes within the domain of the 
NAFTA parties that could most effectively be used to protect the 
environment. 
2. How do we move from studies to policy? 
Comments: The CEC was not established to create policy. Therefore, 
perhaps the better question is "How can we move from studies to 
influencing policy?" One school of thought is that since the NAFTA 
studies provide some evidence of environmental damage, policy changes 
must be made now to stop future harm that could be irreversible. 
Alternatively, another school of thought is that this fIrst round of CEC 
studies is not conclusive enough, and provides little evidence of the 
extent of many of these environmental problems. Therefore, it is best to 
wait until more conclusive evidence is gathered. 
Since the CEC has no policy-makjng authority, it must play the role of an 
effective advocate. In the author's view, the CEC needs to continue to 
produce consistent, scientifIc, and reliable environmental studies, along 
with objective, environmentally sensitive, non-political, and conclusion-
drawing factual records, to most effectively influence the NAFTA parties 
to make the necessary environmental policy changes identifIed by the 
CEC in order to optimize the protection of the environment. 
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The complexity of the issues discussed in this paper illustrates more than 
anything else that perhaps the most important ingredient required to 
solve the NAFf A environmental dilemma will be the continued 
cooperation and support of the NAFf A parties and citizens themselves. 
But even more importantly, environmentally focused regional and global 
cooperation will be required to save this earth for the living creatures and 
human beings yet to be born. 
Some wise words still resonate to this day from Job 12:8, even though 
they were written thousands of years ago - that we must forever "Speak 
to the earth, and it will teach thee." With the destiny of the environment 
in our hands, man continues to speak loudly and profoundly with positive 
and negative deeds that reflect upon our environment. But regardless of 
which avenue of respect for Mother Nature we choose to take, the earth 
will ultimately teach us all lessons that we, as human beings, mayor may 
not be able to endure. 
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